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Summary of the dissertation 
Entrepreneurship is predominantly treated as a private-sector phenomenon and 
consequently its increasing importance in the public sector goes largely unremarked. That 
impedes the research field of entrepreneurship being capable of spanning multiple sectors. 
Accordingly, recent research calls for the study of corporate entrepreneurship (CE) as it 
manifests in the public sector where it can be labeled public entrepreneurship (PE). This 
dissertation considers government an essential entrepreneurial actor and is led by the central 
research question: What are the peculiarities of the public sector and how do they impact public 
enterprises’ entrepreneurial orientation (EO)? 
Accordingly, this dissertation includes three studies focusing on public enterprises. Two 
of the studies set the scope of this thesis by investigating a specific type of organization in a 
specific context—German majority-government-owned energy suppliers. These enterprises 
operate in a liberalized market experiencing environmental uncertainties like competitiveness 
and business transformation. 
The aims and results of the studies included in this dissertation can be summarized as 
follows: The systematic literature review illuminates the stimuli of and barriers to 
entrepreneurial activities in public enterprises and the potential outcomes of such activities 
discussed so far. The review reveals that research on EO has tended to focus on the private 
sector and consequently that barriers to and outcomes of entrepreneurial activities in the public 
sector remain under-researched. Building on these findings, the qualitative study focuses on the 
interrelated barriers affecting entrepreneurship in public enterprises and the outcomes of 
entrepreneurial activities being inhibited. The study adopts an explorative comparative causal 
mapping approach to address the above-mentioned research goal and the lack of clarity around 
how barriers identified in the public sphere are interrelated. Furthermore, the study bases its 
investigation on the different business segments of sales (competitive market) and the 
distribution grid (natural monopoly) to account for recent calls for fine-grained research on PE. 
Results were compared with prior findings in the public and private sector. That comparison 




relating to both sectors. Examples include barriers associated with the external environment 
such as legal constraints and barriers originating from within the organization such as employee 
behavior linked to a value system that hampers entrepreneurial action. However, the most 
important finding is that a public enterprise’s supervisory board can hinder its progress, a 
finding running counter to those of previous private-sector research and one that underscores 
the widespread prejudice that the involvement of a public shareholder and its nominated board 
of directors has a negative effect on EO. The third study is quantitative (data collection via a 
questionnaire) and builds on both its predecessors to examine the little understood topic of 
board behavior and public enterprises’ social orientation as predictors of EO. The study’s results 
indicate that social orientation represses EO, whereas board strategy control (BSC) does not 
seem to predict EO. Regarding BSC, we find that the local government owners in our sample 
are less involved in BSC. The third study also examines board networking and finds its 
relationship with EO depends on the ownership structure of the public-sector organization. An 
important finding is that minority shareholders, such as majority privately-owned enterprises 
and hub firms, repress EO when engaging in board networking. 
In summary, this doctoral thesis contributes to the under-researched topic of CE in the 
public sector. It investigates the peculiarities of this sector by focusing on the supervisory board 
and social oriented activities and their impact on the enterprise’s EO in the quantitative study. 
The thesis addresses institutional questions regarding ownership and the last study in particular 
contributes to expanding resource dependence theory, and invites a nuanced perspective: The 
original perspective suggests that interorganizational arrangements like interfirm network ties 
and equity holdings reduce external resource dependency and consequently improve firm 
performance. The findings within this thesis expose resource delivery to potential contrary 






Zusammenfassung der Dissertation 
Unternehmertum wird vornehmlich als privatwirtschaftliches Phänomen behandelt. 
Folglich bleibt dessen zunehmende Bedeutung im öffentlichen Sektor weitgehend unbemerkt. 
Dementsprechend fordert die Forschung die Untersuchung von Corporate Entrepreneurship 
(CE) im öffentlichen Sektor, wo es als Public Entrepreneurship (PE) bezeichnet wird. Diese 
Dissertation betrachtet den Staat als wesentlichen unternehmerischen Akteur und wird von der 
zentralen Forschungsfrage geleitet: Was sind die Besonderheiten des öffentlichen Sektors und 
wie wirken sie sich auf die unternehmerische Orientierung (EO) öffentlicher Unternehmen aus? 
Diese Dissertation umfasst drei Studien, die sich auf öffentliche Unternehmen 
konzentrieren. Zwei der Studien untersuchen deutsche Energieversorger im mehrheitlichen 
Besitz der öffentlichen Hand. Damit geben sie den Rahmen der Dissertation vor. Diese 
Unternehmen agieren in einem liberalisierten Markt, wo sie mit Unsicherheiten wie 
zunehmendem Wettbewerb konfrontiert werden, wodurch ein Unternehmenswandel 
unabdingbar wird. 
Die Ziele und Ergebnisse der drei Studien lassen sich wie folgt zusammenfassen: Der 
systematische Literaturüberblick beleuchtet die beeinflussenden Faktoren sowie die Effekte 
unternehmerischer Aktivitäten in öffentlichen Unternehmen. Diese Überblicksstudie des 
aktuellen Forschungsstands zeigt, dass sich die EO-Forschung eher auf den privaten Sektor 
konzentriert hat und dass die Hindernisse und Ergebnisse unternehmerischer Aktivitäten im 
öffentlichen Sektor zu wenig erforscht sind. Darauf aufbauend konzentriert sich die qualitative 
Studie auf die Barrieren, die das Unternehmertum in öffentlichen Unternehmen beeinträchtigen, 
und darauf, was aus einem gehemmten Unternehmertum resultiert. Die Studie wendet die 
Comparative Causal Mapping Methode an, um das o. g. Forschungsziel zu verfolgen und 
Unklarheiten zu beseitigen, wie die identifizierten Barrieren zusammenhängen. Die Studie 
stützt ihre Untersuchung auf zwei Teilbereiche des Energiemarktes – einen wettbewerblichen 
(Vertrieb) und einen durch natürliche Monopole gekennzeichneten (Verteilnetz) – um den 
Forderungen nach einer „feinkörnigen“ PE-Forschung nachzukommen. Die Ergebnisse wurden 




zeigt, dass die aufgedeckten Barrieren mit Aspekten aus früheren Arbeiten übereinstimmen. 
Dazu gehören Barrieren, die dem externen Umfeld entstammen, wie z. B. der vorherrschende 
Rechtsrahmen, und Barrieren, die aus dem Inneren der Organisation stammen, wie z. B. das 
Verhalten der Mitarbeiter. Der wichtigste Befund ist jedoch, dass der Aufsichtsrat eines 
öffentlichen Unternehmens dessen unternehmerischen Fortschritt behindern kann. Diese 
Erkenntnis läuft den Ergebnissen früherer Forschung mit Fokus auf den privaten Sektor zuwider 
und unterstreicht das verbreitete Vorurteil, dass sich das Mitwirken des öffentlichen 
Anteilseigners/Aufsichtsrats negativ auf die EO auswirken kann. Die quantitative Studie 
(Datenerhebung via Fragebogen) baut auf beiden o. g. Studien auf. Sie fokussiert auf das 
Verhalten des Aufsichtsrats und die soziale Orientierung des Unternehmens im Hinblick auf 
deren Auswirkungen auf die EO des Unternehmens. Die Studienergebnisse deuten darauf hin, 
dass die soziale Orientierung die EO mindert, während die Beteiligung des Aufsichtsrats an der 
Kontrolle auf strategischer Ebene (Board Strategy Control [BSC]) die EO nicht vorhersagt. 
Was die BSC betrifft, so wird deutlich, dass die lokalen öffentlichen Eigentümer weniger stark 
an der BSC beteiligt sind. Die Studie betrachtet auch die „Vernetzung“ der Aufsichtsräte (Board 
Networking). Demnach hängt der Einfluss von Board Networking auf die EO von der 
Eigentümerstruktur ab. In diesem Zusammenhang ist bedeutsam, dass Minderheits-
gesellschafter, wie z. B. mehrheitlich in Privatbesitz befindliche Unternehmen, die EO 
vermindern, wenn sie Board Networking betreiben. 
Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass diese Dissertation einen Beitrag zum wenig 
erforschten Thema „CE im öffentlichen Sektor“ leistet. Sie untersucht die Besonderheiten 
dieses Sektors, indem sie sich v. a. in der quantitativen Studie auf den Aufsichtsrat und die 
soziale Orientierung sowie deren beider Auswirkungen auf die EO konzentriert. Insbesondere 
diese Studie trägt zur Erweiterung der Resource Dependence Theorie bei: Diese legt nahe, dass 
Verbindungen zwischen Unternehmen (z. B. über Netzwerke und Beteiligungsverhältnisse) die 
Abhängigkeit von externen Ressourcen verringern und damit die Unternehmensleistung 
erhöhen. Die Ergebnisse der vorliegenden Arbeit zeigen potentiell konträre Effekte und ver-
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In recent decades the public sector has been subject to multiple reforms aiming to 
improve performance by targeting areas like efficiency and public value (Swann, 2017). 
However, public enterprises are still described as the organizational type most resistant to 
change (Millward, 2011) and as being the most subject to political interference, factors that are 
blamed for the low performance levels of public enterprises compared to those of private firms 
(Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Following this line of argumentation, 
the public sector in general is described as being “incompatible with manifestations of 
entrepreneurialism” (Bernier, 2014, p. 258) and empirical results suggest that the strategic 
posture of entrepreneurial orientation (EO) might still be at a lower level in publicly owned 
organizations than in their private and non-profit counterparts (Hinz & Ingerfurth, 2013). It is 
therefore unsurprising that most of the general public associate the term entrepreneurship with 
heroic individuals or innovative private-sector corporates disrupting whole branches of 
commerce. Similarly in research, entrepreneurship is predominantly a private-sector 
phenomenon (Liddle & McElwee, 2019). Unfortunately, the increasing importance of EO in 
the public sphere remains mainly unremarked (Kraus et al., 2019; Meynhardt & Diefenbach, 
2012), even though the public sector is critically relevant as an entrepreneurial actor 
(Mazzucato, 2018): its enterprises generate approximately 10% of world gross domestic 
product and more than one tenth of the world’s largest corporates are state owned (Bruton et 
al., 2015). Alongside their economic impact, those public-sector enterprises contribute 
significantly to modern society in terms of guaranteeing and improving public value (Swann, 
2017). 
The overarching purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to the under-researched 
topic of entrepreneurship in the public sector. It does so by revealing unknown stimulators of 
and barriers to entrepreneurial activities in public enterprises while simultaneously 
underscoring governments’ importance as an essential entrepreneurial actor. The dissertation 
accordingly comprises three interrelated and consecutive studies. Before presenting the 




phenomenon of entrepreneurship in a public-sector context will be discussed. Second, the 
purpose and scope of this dissertation will be presented. Third, the structure and key results of 
this dissertation are presented via its research framework (Figure 1) and an overview of the 
conducted studies with their key results in Table 1. 
1.1 Embedding corporate entrepreneurship in the public sector 
To counteract the limited recognition of government as an essential entrepreneurial 
actor, discussions about public enterprises have recently been reinvigorated (Bernier & Reeves, 
2018; Papenfuß & Keppeler, 2020). Unfortunately, knowledge remains severely limited. While 
early research in the 1980s defined public enterprises as monopolistic administrative entities 
(Florio, 2014), research today is clear that they are far more profit-oriented than in the past or 
are even expected to generate profit as if they operate in the private sector (Bernier, 2011, 2014). 
In this dissertation, they are defined as being majority owned by government and are a separate 
legal entity. Therefore, citizens are the ultimate (co-)owners of public enterprises (Blankart, 
1983). Furthermore, these enterprises compete in a liberalized market environment and have a 
profit orientation, but have also other, non-financial objectives, such as social responsibilities 
in terms of the provision of services of general interest, which can be understood as the 
provision of a sufficient number of goods and services that are indispensable for life, such as 
energy supply, public transport, and waste management in an affordable manner to all citizens, 
regardless of whether doing so is profitable for the public enterprise (Mühlemeier, 2019; 
Neumeier, 2015). 
In this context, it is important to note that the public sector itself remains incompletely 
described and demarcated in the literature. Even though research is gradually presenting a 
clearer picture of what public enterprises are, the public sector is commonly described as a 
uniform monopolistic entity with a focus on academic institutions and monopolistic 
governmental organizations (Bernier, 2014; Papenfuß & Keppeler, 2020) despite the manifold 
variants of public organizations (Liddle & McElwee, 2019). This depiction seems even less 




public administration entities that have already been revealed (Morris & Jones, 1999; Smith, 
2012, 2014). 
Broadly speaking, entrepreneurship deals with the recognition and exploitation of 
profitable opportunities (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Even though the common 
understanding of public enterprises is that they also have an explicit profit orientation (among 
other objectives) (Bernier, 2014), this dissertation stresses a broader perspective on 
entrepreneurship in arguing that profitable opportunities cannot simply be equated with value 
creation for the private sector/individual in terms of monetary gains but with “simply superior 
ways of doing things” (Klein et al., 2010, p. 3). This opens up entrepreneurship for various 
areas such as the political sphere (Ramamurti, 1986), socially-oriented entrepreneurs (Brändle 
et al., 2019), creative artists (Schulte-Holthaus, 2018), and ecological start-ups (Kuckertz et al., 
2019). Following this line of argumentation, the different concepts of entrepreneurship are also 
adaptable and meaningful in the public sphere (Klein et al., 2010; Ramamurti, 1986) such as 
the creation or discovery of opportunities (Kirzner, 1973), the introduction of new products and 
processes with potentially disruptive characteristics (Schumpeter, 1934), and decision-making 
on investments under uncertainty (Knight, 1921) (see also Klein et al., 2010). 
Nevertheless, the phenomenon of entrepreneurship is mostly associated with 
private-sector corporates (Liddle & McElwee, 2019; Smith, 2012), yet this dissertation is 
inspired by the importance of government as an essential entrepreneurial actor (Mazzucato, 
2018) and is therefore led by the idea of embedding corporate entrepreneurship (CE) in the 
public sector. CE deals with entrepreneurial activities within established organizations (Covin 
& Slevin, 1991; Zahra & Covin, 1995). This dissertation builds on the classic definition of CE 
by Miller (1983, p. 771): “An entrepreneurial firm is one that engages in product-market 
innovation, undertakes somewhat risky ventures, and is first to come up with ‘proactive’ 
innovations, beating competitors to the punch.” (for an overview of definitions of CE, see also 
Arz, 2017). Building on prior studies in the field (e.g., Bernier, 2014; Smith, 2012, 2014), this 
dissertation focuses on public-sector organizations that are embedded in the literature stream of 
public entrepreneurship (PE). Generally speaking, PE is described as if it fundamentally 




at least regarding its “definition, process nature, and underlying dimensions” (Morris et al., 
2011, p. 147). Accordingly, this dissertation defines public entrepreneurship as all 
entrepreneurial activity, thus encompassing innovative, proactive, and risk-taking activities 
within public-sector organizations. 
Therefore, the essence of CE in the public sector is (also) captured through the 
dimensions of EO (Dess & Lumpkin, 2005; Zahra & Covin, 1995). Having its roots in the 
strategy-making literature, EO is a firm-level posture (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Miller, 1983) and 
as such describes the extent to which enterprises corroborate innovativeness and proactiveness 
with respect to risk-related activities (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Miller, 1983). Innovativeness 
reflects the pursuit of, and ability to produce, innovations (Covin & Miller, 2014). It includes 
not only the actual amount of new products and services introduced but also extensive changes 
to product or service lines (Covin & Slevin, 1989). Proactiveness reflects being in a 
market-leading position with respect to the introduction of novel products and being a 
first-mover instead of simply imitating competitors’ actions (Covin & Slevin, 1989). 
Risk-taking reflects undertaking bold actions with the prospect of high returns instead of taking 
cautious incremental steps to achieve the firm’s objectives (Covin & Slevin, 1989). By seizing 
potential opportunities, firms accept the risk of possibly costly incorrect decisions (Covin & 
Slevin, 1989). 
Recent research suggests EO is a form of CE because typically the repetition of 
entrepreneurial events indicates a high degree of EO (Covin & Wales, 2019). While both 
concepts are closely related, EO as an organizational attribute is a behavioral construct, while 
CE can be defined as an activity within the organization (Covin & Wales, 2019). 
Entrepreneurial orientation is an indispensable stimulator of organizational performance, be it 
in the public or private-sector sphere (Caruana et al., 2002; Kearney et al., 2009), as it enhances 
financial and non-financial performance indicators (Rauch et al., 2009). 
Existing entrepreneurship research mainly relies on classic private-sector literature that 
impedes the theoretical soundness of entrepreneurship as a field of research capable of spanning 
multiple sectors (Liddle & McElwee, 2019; Smith, 2012). It becomes clear when delimiting the 




(e.g., Bernier, 2014; Ramamurti, 1986; Smith, 2014): an example is the inadequate 
consideration of institutional questions regarding governmental ownership that might reveal 
obstacles to entrepreneurship that differ from those evident in the private-sector sphere 
(Bernier, 2014). Suggestions to address these questions regularly refer to political interference, 
examples being politicians described as the “essence of the problem” (Sørensen, 2007, p. 1046) 
or public enterprises’ boards of directors (BoD) as hindering the progress of entrepreneurial 
ideas (Bernier, 2014). Consequently, these suggestions are linked to new institutional 
economics (NIE). By combining NIE with public choice theory to establish the theoretical 
framework of new public management (NPM) (Schedler & Proeller, 2011), public enterprises 
are assumed to perform worse than their private counterparts (e.g., Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000; 
Martin & Parker, 1997; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). This is corroborated with empirical results 
suggesting that the EO might still be at a lower level in publicly owned organizations than in 
their private and non-profit counterparts (Hinz & Ingerfurth, 2013). 
In summary, research on PE remains discordant and dispersed: It even presents 
conflicting results on whether the classic dimensions of EO are applicable (Bernier, 2014; 
Kearney et al., 2010; Smith, 2012) and seems to have difficulty in specifying objectives and 
outcomes in the public sphere (Klein et al., 2010; Liddle & McElwee, 2019), and moreover, 
discusses whether entrepreneurship might conflict with democratic values (Bellone & Goerl, 
1992). Consequently, the existing literature is still not clear about the role of EO in the public 
sector (Liddle & McElwee, 2019; Morris et al., 2011) and what hinders and fosters it in public 
enterprises (Meynhardt & Diefenbach, 2012; Smith, 2014). Nevertheless, public enterprises 
might offer one of the most promising contexts in which to study entrepreneurship in the public 
sector (Bernier, 2014; Luke & Verreynne, 2006a), contributing to the recognition regarding the 





1.2 Purpose and scope of the dissertation 
As the previous sections have outlined, entrepreneurship in the public sector is an 
essential area for research and practice with fundamental questions remaining to be answered. 
Accordingly, this dissertation follows the calls to broaden the research stream on corporate 
entrepreneurship (e.g., Kuratko, 2017; Morris et al., 2011) and contributes to recent efforts to 
foster the spillover of EO into the public sector (Covin & Wales, 2019; Martens et al., 2016). 
High-performing and successful public enterprises can bolster economic systems 
worldwide (Bruton et al., 2015) and increase the standard of living in every society due to 
supplying powerful services of general interest (Mühlemeier, 2019). This influence underscores 
the relevance of understanding government as an essential entrepreneurial actor (Mazzucato, 
2018) and embeds the idea of entrepreneurship extending beyond the classic private-sector 
corporates to energize a high-performing public sector. This dissertation starts from the premise 
that the entrepreneurial role of government is not solely to enhance and accelerate private-sector 
growth by implementing effective frameworks and the rules of the game (Klein et al., 2010)1. 
The purpose of this thesis is therefore “to think concretely about how to build ‘entrepreneurial’ 
organizations within the public sector” (Mazzucato, 2018, p. XIX). Consequently, this 
dissertation deals with questions regarding governmental ownership and its impact on the 
strategic posture of EO within public enterprises, which connects to the overarching research 
question: 
What are the peculiarities of the public sector and how do they impact public enterprises’ EO? 
To contribute to the field of entrepreneurship and address the challenges of public 
entrepreneurship with the presented overarching research question, this dissertation includes 
three interrelated and consecutive studies that will be presented in Section 1.3 in further detail. 
Importantly and with reference to the scope of this thesis, the samples in both empirical studies 
in Sections 3 and 4 solely include German majority-governmental-owned energy suppliers, 
answering the recent calls of research to conduct studies on a specific type of organization in a 
 





specific context (Lomberg et al., 2017; Miller, 2011). This may confine generalizability but 
may help to increase the validity of the research findings as it clearly defines the sample’s 
boundaries (Miller, 2011). Such an approach is especially useful in public-sector research that 
commonly but inadequately defines the public sector as a monopolistic entity that is relatively 
independent of external influences (Liddle & McElwee, 2019), despite research revealing 
remarkable differences between public-sector organizations regarding entrepreneurial activities 
(Morris & Jones, 1999; Smith, 2012, 2014). Furthermore, many of these enterprises are former 
monopolists, but today operate in a liberalized energy market experiencing uncertainty in terms 
of the conditions affecting competitiveness and business transformation (Löbbe & Jochum, 
2016; Mühlemeier, 2019). An example would be the issues confronting the German energy 
sector that is undertaking a system transformation (Energiewende) that includes aspects like the 
switch from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources and digitalization (Löbbe & Hackbarth, 
2017; Mazzucato, 2018). Additionally, Germany has a high level of urban self-governance and 
places considerable importance on the concept of public services, an example is running public 
buses, which are often provided by locally-owned utilities (Mühlemeier, 2019). Consequently, 
the environment of these enterprises is increasingly hostile and therefore requires the 
enhancement of an organization’s EO (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Löbbe & Hackbarth, 2017). 
In summary, the overarching purpose of this dissertation to contribute to the 
under-researched topic of corporate entrepreneurship in the public sector and to support the 
development of high-performing public enterprises. This will be achieved by revealing drivers 
of entrepreneurial activities in public enterprises. The following section presents the structure 
and key results of this dissertation. 
1.3 Structure and key results of the dissertation 
The purpose of the thesis will be achieved by way of the following structure of the 
included studies. As mentioned above, the definition of public enterprises and the samples in 
both empirical studies in Sections 3 and 4 set the context of entrepreneurship in this dissertation. 
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Figure 1: Structure of the dissertation 
Figure 1 illustrates how this dissertation focuses on entrepreneurship in established 
organizations within the public-sector context. The first study is a systematic literature review 
(SLR) (Section 2) that builds on the available research and addresses the required but so far 
missing overview of stimulators of, and barriers to, entrepreneurial activities in public 
enterprises. The review is supplemented by findings on potential outcomes of such activities. 
Building on the research gaps revealed in the SLR, the second study (Section 3) explores and 
differentiates potential barriers to PE, supplemented by potential outcomes of PE being 
inhibited. This is based on previous research suggesting public-sector organizations both suffer 
from weaker performance than their private-sector counterparts and also from a reduced level 
of EO (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000; Hinz & Ingerfurth, 2013) and also evidence that barriers 
to, and outcomes of, PE in the public sector remain unclear (Cinar et al., 2019; Liddle & 
McElwee, 2019; Smith, 2014). Finally, the third study (Section 4) builds on the findings of 
Study 1 and Study 2 and focuses on the behavior of the BoD of public-sector organizations that 




clarifying the statement that the public sector might be “incompatible with manifestations of 
entrepreneurialism” (Bernier, 2014, p. 258). 
With the guidance of the general framework in Figure 1, Table 1 gives an overview of 
the studies included in this dissertation, providing information such as (analytical) methods 
used in each specific study and what key findings emerged. After the overview presented in 
Table 1, all three studies will be described more in detail, supplemented with their specific 




Table 1: Overview of the studies presented in this dissertation 
Section Study Research question(s) Country Sample size Method Key findings 
2 Linking Two Worlds? 
Entrepreneurial 
Orientation in Public 
Enterprises: A 
Systematic Review 
and Research Agenda 
What is the state of the 
art regarding 
entrepreneurship and EO 
in public enterprises? 
 
 








• Literature biased toward the private sector 
• Insufficient attention paid to institutional questions 
regarding ownership; different obstacles in the 
public sector than in the private sphere 
• Unclear drivers of entrepreneurial activities in public 
enterprises, e.g. unknown impact of social goals and 
public ownership 
• Differences between public-sector organizations 
largely ignored; public sector treated as an entity 










b) What are the 



















• Remarkable differences between sales segment and 
distribution grid segment regarding barriers to and 
outcomes of entrepreneurial activities call for 
fine-grained research on PE 
• Different approaches to managing/stimulating the 
underlying entrepreneurial dimensions might be 
required to enhance each segment’s performance 
• Supervisory board a potential contributor to public 
enterprises’ inertia in both business segments, 
revealing a perspective apparently contrasting with 
that of prior private-sector research 
4 Uncovering a 





Orientation in Public 
Enterprises 
To what extent do board 
behavior and social 
orientation predict public 
enterprises’ EO in 














• Local public ownership represses board strategy 
control (BSC), but no (negative) effect of BSC on 
EO 
• Board networking–EO relationship depending on 
ownership structure: not the usually suspected local 
public owner that represses EO, but minority 
shareholders 
• Social orientation represses EO, but no (positive) 




The first study is presented in Section 2, and is titled Linking Two Worlds? 
Entrepreneurial Orientation in Public Enterprises: A Systematic Review and Research Agenda. 
Based on a SLR (Booth et al., 2012; Köhn, 2018; Röhm, 2018; Tranfield et al., 2003), this paper 
investigates academic research on entrepreneurship conducted in this specific context. It is 
guided by the overarching research question: 
What is the state of the art regarding entrepreneurship and EO in public enterprises? 
The goal is to stress the importance of the government as an essential entrepreneurial 
actor with its reinvigorated phenomenon of public enterprises and to provide an overview of 
the current knowledge of the phenomenon. Therefore, the study aims to provide an overview 
of factors fostering and repressing EO in public enterprises discussed so far, supplemented by 
potential outcomes of EO. To the best of my knowledge, it is the first SLR that examines 
entrepreneurship in public enterprises, with a special focus on EO. In this paper, 40 conceptual 
and empirical articles published in peer-reviewed journals are analyzed systematically and 
classified in an integrative framework. Based on this literature, the main result and contribution 
is the developed research framework (Figure 4) that organizes existing research and helps to 
identify contradictory findings and underrepresented areas. Consequently, this research 
framework leads to an explicit agenda with promising avenues for future research (Table 3). 
The main results of the SLR include the finding that EO studies in the public sector remain 
scarce, leading to the literature generally being biased toward the private sector (Smith, 2012), 
a factor that might have caused research to have paid inadequate attention to public-sector 
peculiarities such as institutional questions regarding government ownership. This finding 
underscores that the factors fostering and repressing EO in the public sector as well as the 
potential outcomes of EO remain unclear (Kearney et al., 2009; Smith, 2014). Smith (2014) in 
particular highlights the important but so far unattended role of the governing body in this 
specific public context. Following this line of argumentation, one important avenue for future 
research would be for qualitative studies that explore the peculiarities of the public sector with 
special reference to potential constraints of entrepreneurial activities such as the interference of 
the public owner and social goals (e.g., Bernier, 2014; Furlong, 2015; Ramamurti, 1986; Smith, 




attention to the sample’s boundaries, and therefore differentiate between government 
administrations and modern public enterprises instead of interpreting the public sector as a 
homogenous entity (Smith, 2012, 2014). 
The second study of this thesis is titled Barriers to Entrepreneurship in Public 
Enterprises: Boards Contributing to Inertia (Section 3) and it builds on the findings of the 
preceding SLR that revealed that the specific barriers to entrepreneurial activities in the public 
sector and the outcomes of those activities being inhibited remain unclear. Among other 
reasons, this might be explained by the fact that research has predominantly built on previous 
private-sector studies, and has therefore paid insufficient attention to the peculiarities of the 
public sector that determine its entrepreneurial activity (e.g., Bernier, 2014; Ramamurti, 1986) 
such as the institutional questions regarding government ownership. The article deals with two 
related research questions: 
What are the interrelated barriers affecting entrepreneurship in public enterprises? and What 
are the outcomes of inhibited forms of entrepreneurship in these enterprises? 
To address both questions, this study adopts an explorative CCM approach (Laukkanen, 
2012). This method accounts for the calls of qualitative studies that ideally should focus on the 
complexity of entrepreneurial phenomena (Miller, 2011; Wales, 2016). This is particularly 
necessary in the public sector where the interrelatedness of barriers to entrepreneurial activities 
remains unclear (Cinar et al., 2019). Besides its methodical contributions, the paper offers an 
extension of Smith’s (2014) model because this article not only focuses on determinants 
influencing PE—as Smith (2014) did—but also addresses potential outcomes of PE being 
inhibited. In doing so, it challenges the traditional view of the homogenous public sector (Liddle 
& McElwee, 2019). The article achieves its goals by examining the different business segments 
of sales and the distribution grid of 12 German (majority-)municipally owned energy suppliers 
aided by information gleaned from 18 semi-structured interviews. Furthermore, this approach 
also addresses recent calls in the literature to clearly define the sample’s boundaries that might 
help to improve the validity of the findings (Lomberg et al., 2017; Miller, 2011). The interviews 
were conducted with middle managers who have a vital role in entrepreneurship in 




segment-specific barriers underscore prior calls for fine-grained research on PE depending on 
the context of the segment (Bysted & Hansen, 2015; Smith, 2014). Moreover, entrepreneurial 
activities in the sales and distribution grid business segments may also result in different 
performance outcomes. The revealed differences in barriers and outcomes mean that 
substantially different approaches to managing and stimulating the underlying dimensions of 
EO might be required to enhance each segment’s performance. Furthermore, the paper builds 
on the extensive theoretical framework addressed in NPM and new public governance (NPG) 
that considers the institutional questions regarding ownership and provides a detailed 
comparative analysis of the results with literature referring to the private and the public sector. 
Both enable the contextualization of barriers and outcomes with a holistic and broad 
perspective, thereby helping to reveal how public and private enterprises might differ regarding 
entrepreneurship (Liddle & McElwee, 2019). The results indicate that the barriers associated 
with the external environment such as legal constraints (e.g., Bernier, 2014) and those barriers 
arising from within the organization such as employee behavior linked to a value system 
hampering entrepreneurial thinking corroborate aspects discussed in prior research in both 
sectors (e.g., Morris & Trotter, 1990; Mühlemeier, 2019). However, the most important finding 
is that a public enterprise’s supervisory board can hinder its progress, for example by limiting 
growth-oriented activities: A finding that potentially conflicts with those of prior research based 
on the private sector (e.g., Gabrielsson, 2007). That finding underscores the widespread 
prejudice that interference by the public shareholder and its BoD will have negative effects 
(e.g., Bernier, 2014; Ramamurti, 1986; Smith, 2012). On a conceptual level, this corroborates 
suggestions of using stakeholder-agency theory (SAT) to describe the (political) role and 
behavior of a BoD mainly composed of politicians (Hinna et al., 2010; Hinna & Scarozza, 
2015). 
The third and last study in Section 4 is titled Uncovering a Negative Effect of Minority 
Shareholders’ Board Networking Activity on Entrepreneurial Orientation in Public 
Enterprises. It builds directly on the findings of the qualitative study in Section 3 and previous 




of public-sector supervisory boards’ impact on the EO of public enterprises. The paper deals 
with the research question: 
To what extent do board behavior and social orientation predict public enterprises’ EO in 
respect of different ownership structures? 
To address this question, my co-authors and I look beyond traditional agency 
perspectives found in private-sector research (Boivie et al., 2016) and draw on the combination 
of SAT and resource dependence theory (RDT). Data were collected from 110 top managers of 
majority-government owned German energy suppliers working in liberalized markets. To 
account for the findings regarding the differences in the business segments of the sales and 
distribution grid in the qualitative paper (see Section 3), my co-authors and I focused on 
competitive business segments in this quantitative paper. The analytical approach used is SEM 
and we used partial least squares (PLS) analysis. The study’s results indicate that social 
orientation represses EO, whereas BSC and board networking on first sight do not seem to 
predict EO. Regarding BSC, we find that the local governmental owner is less involved in BSC, 
but we do not find a negative effect of BSC on EO in our sample organizations as is often 
hypothesized in previous research and underpinned in the qualitative study. Regarding the 
networking of a BoD, a closer look reveals the relationship between such networking and EO 
depends on the ownership structure in place. Surprisingly, we find that minority shareholders 
like majority privately-owned (i.e., mixed) enterprises and hub firms—the former commonly 
described as better performing than public enterprises (e.g., Brouthers et al., 2007; Inoue et al., 
2013; Megginson & Netter, 2001; Wright et al., 2000), the latter described as fostering the 
innovativeness and performance of organizations they are affiliated with (Kolloch & Reck, 
2017)—repress EO when engaging in board networking activities. On a general level, the study 
contributes to examining the under-researched topic of EO in the public sector (Meynhardt & 
Diefenbach, 2012). In the study, my co-authors and I base our assumptions on the mediating 
but little understood role of board behavior and EO (Coombes et al., 2011) instead of relying 
on the commonly used but implausible input-output model (Dalton et al., 1998) that refers to 
observable characteristics such as board size and its direct effect on firm performance 




The original perspective of that theory suggests that interorganizational arrangements like 
interfirm network ties and equity holdings decrease external resource dependency and 
consequently improve firm performance (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). However, the article 
advances the idea of a fine-grained theory of RDT (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005) by opening 
resource delivery to potential contrary effects to provide a deeper understanding of 
interorganizational action and challenges comparable research that relies on questionable 
input-output modeling (Zona et al., 2018). 
With reference to the structure presented in Figure 1, all three studies will now be 
presented in their entirety in the following Sections 2 to 4. Finally, the dissertation will close 
with Section 5. In that last section, each study’s findings will be summarized and discussed, 
leading to the discussion of the dissertation’s overall contribution to the field of 
entrepreneurship in established organizations. Additionally, avenues for future research in the 
field will be outlined. This dissertation closes with some final thoughts about the thesis and the 




2. Linking two worlds? Entrepreneurial orientation in public 
enterprises: A systematic review and research agenda 
Author: Timo Tremml 
Status and reference: This study is published with the kind permission of John Wiley and Sons. 
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Abstract: Contemporary public enterprises differ from their forebears. Today, they are more 
similar to private enterprises, receiving far more attention than previously, when privatization 
processes all over the world were in the spotlight. Furthermore, the broad research stream of 
entrepreneurship has so far neglected the consideration of public enterprises. To set a future 
research agenda, the author examines the dispersed literature using an integrative and 
organizing framework to identify major topics and research findings. This paper reviews 
articles that investigate the entrepreneurship in contemporary public enterprises. Despite the 
growing scholarly interest globally, this systematic literature review indicates there is no more 
than a loose connection between the literature streams of public entrepreneurship and corporate 
entrepreneurship. Specifically, the review shows that the multidimensional concept of 
entrepreneurial orientation has thus far been ignored, although autonomy plays a significant 
role in the literature review, namely in the context of the interference of the public owner. It 
also reveals other essential research gaps, such as the development of a modern theory of public 
enterprises. The research stream of public entrepreneurship offers a broad area of scholarly 
research and should encourage further investigation. 
Keywords: Public enterprise, entrepreneurial orientation, public-sector corporate 
entrepreneurship 
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Contemporary public enterprises differ from their forebears. Today, they are more 
similar to private enterprises, receiving far more attention than previously, when privatization 
processes all over the world were in the spotlight. Furthermore, the broad research stream of 
entrepreneurship has so far neglected the consideration of public enterprises. To set a future 
research agenda, the author examines the dispersed literature using an integrative and 
organizing framework to identify major topics and research findings. This paper reviews 
articles that investigate the entrepreneurship in contemporary public enterprises. Despite the 
growing scholarly interest globally, this systematic literature review indicates there is no more 
than a loose connection between the literature streams of public entrepreneurship and corporate 
entrepreneurship. Specifically, the review shows that the multidimensional concept of 
entrepreneurial orientation has thus far been ignored, although autonomy plays a significant 
role in the literature review, namely in the context of the interference of the public owner. It 
also reveals other essential research gaps, such as the development of a modern theory of public 
enterprises. The research stream of public entrepreneurship offers a broad area of scholarly 




Today, the phenomenon of the public enterprise works in a very different world than 
that in which it was created (Bernier, 2011). It competes in liberalized markets with other 
enterprises (Rentsch & Finger, 2015) and is more profit-driven than in the past (Bernier, 2014; 
Luke & Verreynne, 2006a). Despite the advent of liberalization processes across the globe, 




between 2007 and 2012, more than 60 new local public utilities have been set up in Germany 
(Hall et al., 2013). Nevertheless, public enterprises are described as most resistant to change 
(Millward, 2011) and as being “incompatible with manifestations of entrepreneurialism” 
(Bernier, 2014, p. 258). 
The idea of entrepreneurship is that it produces superior organizational outcomes 
(Kearney et al., 2009). As a result, entrepreneurship is indispensable, especially since public 
enterprises are asked to make profits as if they operate in the private sector (Bernier, 2011). 
Unfortunately, research on corporate entrepreneurship has primarily been conducted in the 
private-sector context (Kearney et al., 2008, 2010; Martens et al., 2016), which has led to a bias 
in the literature toward those so-called classic enterprises (Smith, 2012). There are few 
systematic and high-quality recent empirical studies on contemporary public enterprises 
(Bernier, 2014; Florio, 2014), even though they could offer a promising context in which to 
find and examine the emerging theme of public entrepreneurship (PE) (Luke & Verreynne, 
2006a; Martens et al., 2016). 
The current inadequate state of research has led to calls for a satisfactory definition of 
the research stream of PE or a theoretical framework or model that illustrates the various 
components affecting the corporate entrepreneurship process in the public sector (Kearney et 
al., 2007, 2010). Therefore, this literature review tries to answer the following questions: 
• What is the state of the art regarding PE and entrepreneurial orientation (EO) in public 
enterprises? 
• How do particular elements describe the phenomenon linked to EO? 
• Are there differences between and consequences of the interpretation of EO in public 
enterprises in comparison with private enterprises? 
• What are the interesting paths for further research on this evolving research stream? 
This paper therefore aims to contribute to the entrepreneurship literature in several ways. 
First, the main contribution is that the developed research framework (Figure 4) helps to 
identify contradictory findings, underrepresented areas, and paths for further research. The 




concept of entrepreneurial orientation and to a closer linkage of the research streams of public 
entrepreneurship and corporate entrepreneurship. To the best of the author’s knowledge, it is 
the first systematic literature review that considers entrepreneurship in public enterprises. 
Second, the selected articles are embedded into a conceptual framework to connect the different 
determinants. In doing so, the framework runs like a common thread through the review, 
structuring the results. Third, the paper offers an overview of the relevant empirical and 
conceptual articles identified, reviewed, and synthesized into a holistic work. 
To this end, the paper is organized as follows: It first presents a classification and 
definition of new public management (NPM) and the institutional framework, public 
enterprises, and PE, before briefly outlining the review approach and descriptive analysis of the 
literature. Third, using the previous step as a foundation, the conceptual framework for 
provision of a systematic structure and the main findings are specified. Fourth, the main 
findings are discussed and potential paths for further research are outlined. Finally, the paper 
refers to its limitations and offers a conclusion. 
2.2 Public enterprises and the relation to NPM and the institutional framework 
The underlying discussion here relates to the NPM concept (e.g., Luke & Verreynne, 
2006a; Sharma et al., 2014). The rise of NPM in recent decades is one of the most pervasive 
international trends in public administration (Hood, 1991), especially in the Anglosphere and 
European countries. Following Florio & Fecher (2011), the core aspect of NPM is to establish 
market mechanisms within the public sector. Services such as education and health, which have 
not yet been privatized in most countries, have been converted in quasi-markets (Florio & 
Fecher, 2011; Millward, 2011). Nevertheless, the design of NPM does vary according to 
national characteristics (Pollitt, 2007). The most influential research streams for NPM are new 
institutional economics and public management (Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991; Schedler & 
















Public choice theory deals with incentive structures and 
decision-making processes that are important for appropriations and 
decisions in the political area in comparison with those in the market 
area (Schedler & Proeller, 2006). Public choice can be defined as the 
application of economics to political science (Mueller, 2003), for 
example, through the characteristically presumption of the homo 
economicus (Schedler & Proeller, 2006). This leads to the assumption 
that all individuals in the political-administrative area, whether 
politician or bureaucrat, pursue their own interests (Aucoin, 1990; 
Mueller, 2003). Bureaucrats tend to be budget maximizers; whereas the 
goal of politicians is to be reelected. Importantly, bureaucracy does not 
optimize social welfare (Niskanen, 1971; Schedler & Proeller, 2006). 
Principal-agent 
theory 
Closely linked to public choice theory, principal-agent theory is based 
on the homo economicus (Schedler & Proeller, 2006). In the context of 
this paper, the principal can be defined as (co-)owner and the agent as 
the manager of the public enterprise. Information asymmetry is 
assumed: the agent has more information than the principal (Pratt & 
Zeckhauser, 1991). This leads to the problem that, if the agent and the 
principal pursue self-interested goals, the agent can use the information 
advantage to mislead the principal (Schedler & Proeller, 2006). As a 
result, the principal tries to counter by cutting the agent’s autonomy 




- This literature stream pursues the target of injecting “managerialism”, 
that is, management structures and approaches, into the public sector 
(Aucoin, 1990). The influence of public management on NPM was 
focused on emphasizing management aspects in the public sector 
through the techniques and approaches of the private sector (Aucoin, 
1990; Pollitt, 1990).  
The basic premise of NPM is that the state exists in its basic form and is democratically 
legitimized (Schedler & Proeller, 2006). This leads to the point that public organizations are 
democratically legitimized as well (Hakvoort & Klaassen, 2007). The institutional framework 
for the modern view on administration is therefore legitimation in terms of democratic values 
and a law-based state as well as the rule of law (Schedler & Proeller, 2006). The rule of law 
“refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and 
private, including the [state] itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, 
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international 




law, the law should govern and no one, including the government, should be above it (OECD, 
2015a). 
Parts of the NPM doctrine are outdated (Florio & Fecher, 2011) for, among other 
reasons, the public sector should not be considered as an entity (Bernier & Hafsi, 2007). Public 
enterprises have been part of research for a couple of decades, but mainly in a public monopoly 
market environment, as that was the typical textbook case until the 1980s (Florio, 2014). Today, 
these enterprises operate in a liberalized market context (Rentsch & Finger, 2015) and have a 
more profit-driven orientation than in the past (Bernier, 2014; Luke & Verreynne, 2006a). 
Although many authors have tried to describe the phenomenon of public enterprises (see 
the appendix of Section 2), no universally accepted definition can be found within the literature. 
In this paper, public enterprises are characterized as: 
a) more than 50% owned or co-owned by national, regional, or local government, 
b) having a legal entity separate from the government, 
c) having financial (for-profit) motives, among others (e.g., social or ecological), and 
d) working in a liberalized market environment, including natural monopolies 
(monopolistic bottlenecks) within these liberalized markets. 
Accordingly, public enterprises face many of the same challenges as private-sector 
organizations, such as competition (Luke & Verreynne, 2006a; Rentsch & Finger, 2015). The 
literature largely ignores explicit connections to entrepreneurship; however, contemporary 
public enterprises are part of the research stream evolving from public entrepreneurship 
(Bernier, 2011). This research stream remains concentrated on academic institutions or 
government organizations, and thus largely ignores public enterprises (Bernier, 2014). These 
facts are of utmost importance given the nature of entrepreneurship, which is different from the 
classic public or social entrepreneurship often associated with the public sector (Luke et al., 
2010). 
2.3 Entrepreneurship in the public sector 
The idea of entrepreneurship is that it produces superior organizational performance 




concerned with the recognition and exploitation of profitable opportunities (Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000). As stated by Kuckertz et al. (2017, p. 92), opportunity recognition “is 
characterized by being alert to potential business opportunities, actively searching for them, and 
gathering information about new ideas on products or services.” The same article goes on to 
describe opportunity exploitation as “developing a product or service based on a perceived 
entrepreneurial opportunity, acquiring appropriate human resources, gathering financial 
resources, and setting up the organization.” (Kuckertz et al., 2017, p. 92). 
The few attempts to link the worlds of public enterprises and corporate entrepreneurship 
mean that there is no generally accepted definition of PE within the literature. Kearney et al. 
(2009, p. 28) do, however, provide a broad definition: “[The] process that exists within the 
public sector organization that results in innovative activities such as the development of new 
and existing services, technologies, administrative techniques, and new improved strategies, 
risk taking and proactivity. Personal goals and objectives are less important than the generation 
of a good result for the state/ semi-state enterprise.” 
The definition of PE used in this paper is closely related to that of Kearney et al. (2009): 
The process that exists within the public enterprise that results in innovative activities such as 
the development of new and existing products and services, technologies, administrative 
techniques, and new improved strategies, risk-taking, and proactivity. 
The above definitions capture the essence of corporate entrepreneurship with the 
dimensions of EO, namely innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness (Zahra & Covin, 
1995). This concept was developed by Miller (1983). Innovativeness equals the “predisposition 
to engage in creativity and experimentation through the introduction of new products/services 
as well as technological leadership via R&D in new processes. Risk taking involves taking bold 
actions by venturing into the unknown, borrowing heavily, and/or committing significant 
resources to ventures in uncertain environments. Proactiveness is an opportunity-seeking, 
forward-looking perspective characterized by the introduction of new products and services 





Drawing on Miller (1983), Lumpkin & Dess (1996) added two additional dimensions 
and suggested the multidimensional character of the EO construct. Competitive aggressiveness 
“refers to a firm’s propensity to directly and intensely challenge its competitors to achieve entry 
or improve position, that is, to outperform industry rivals in the marketplace” (Lumpkin & Dess, 
1996, p. 148). Autonomy is “the ability and will to be self-directed in the pursuit of 
opportunities. In an organizational context, it refers to action taken free of stifling 
organizational constraints” (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996, p. 140). 
While classical themes on EO have been investigated for a little more than 30 years, 
there is still room for studies in the underrepresented context of the public sector (Martens et 
al., 2016). To set a research agenda, the next section outlines the review methods, especially 
the collection and analysis of data. 
2.4 Review methods 
This literature review develops an evidence-based body of knowledge and establishes a 
future research agenda via a systematic review as outlined by Tranfield et al. (2003). The current 
review seeks to determine the current state of entrepreneurship research relating to public 
enterprises, and follows the recommendation of Denyer & Tranfield (2009) in first locating, 
selecting, and evaluating relevant research. 
2.4.1 Data collection 
The search string (“public*” AND “entrepreneur*” AND [“sector*” OR “enterprise*” 
OR “compan*” OR “corporat*”]) in the title, abstract, or keywords is limited to encompass 
English-speaking journals published up until December 2016.2 The review was limited to 
peer-reviewed journal articles, which can be classified as validated knowledge and are likely to 
have the greatest impact on the research field (Keupp et al., 2012; Podsakoff et al., 2005). The 
criterion for inclusion was an examination of entrepreneurship in conjunction with the 
developed definition of public enterprises, and accordingly, services in quasi-markets (Florio 
& Fecher, 2011; Millward, 2011) do not feature in this literature review. The review only 
 
2 Before conducting the review, a pilot search in the field was conducted to obtain an overview of the relevant 
literature, to clarify the basis of the researcher’s work, and to specify how the proposed systematic review fits into 




considers empirical papers when they follow the specified definition of public enterprises. In 
mixed samples, at least one of the objects under investigation must follow the definition. 
Conceptual papers are considered when they examine public entrepreneurship in a liberalized 
market context with a profit orientation (e.g., Bernier, 2011) or when they treat the public sector 
in a way that supports an application to the underlying context (e.g., Kearney et al., 2008; 
Ramamurti, 1986). 
Applying the selection process recommended by Booth et al. (2012) resulted in 247 
articles progressing to full-text analysis. The rejected articles mainly focused on non-profit 
organizations (e.g., education) and political (e.g., government acting like an entrepreneur) and 
financial issues (e.g., going public). After the full-text analysis, 33 articles remained. Reference 
checking as a supplementary search technique (Booth et al., 2012) identified seven additional 
papers matching the inclusion criteria. Ultimately, the current review incorporates 40 articles. 
Figure 2 illustrates the systematic search and selection process. 
Systematic Search 1
• Database: Scopus
• Subject areas: “Business, Management and 
Accounting”, “Decision Sciences”, “Economics, 
Econometrics and Finance”, “Social Sciences”
• Source type: Journal
• Language: English
• Publication date: Until December 2016
• Search string: “public*” AND “entrepreneur*” 
AND (“sector*” OR “enterprise*” OR “compan*” 
OR “corporat*”) in title, abstract, or keywords
n = 2,113 articles
Systematic Search 2
• Database: EBSCO host (Business Source Premier)
• Academic journals
• Source type: Journal
• Language: English
• Publication date: Until December 2016
• Search string: “public*” AND “entrepreneur*” 
AND (“sector*” OR “enterprise*” OR “compan*” 
OR “corporat*”) in title, abstract, or keywords
n = 939 articles
n = 4,111 articles
1,202 doublets removed
n = 33 articles
7 additional articles included (reference checking)
n = 40 articles
2,662 articles excluded after examination of title and/or abstract
n = 247 articles
n = 2,909 articles
Systematic search and selection process
Systematic Search 3
• Database: Web of Science
• Source type: Journal
• Language: English
• Publication date: Until December 2016
• Search string: “public*” AND “entrepreneur*” 
AND (“sector*” OR “enterprise*” OR “compan*” 
OR “corporat*”) in title, abstract, or keywords
n = 1,059 articles
214 articles excluded after examination of full text
Inclusion criteria
• Examination of (public) entrepreneurship
• Follows review’s definition of public enterprises (at least one of the 
objects under investigation in each sample)
• Empirical or conceptual method
• Published in peer-reviewed journal
 
Figure 2: Systematic search and selection process 
To sum up, only studies that met all inclusion criteria and triggered none of the exclusion 
criteria were incorporated into the review so as to ensure it was based on evidence of the best 




2.4.2 Data analysis 
The number of publications per year in Figure 3 shows an unsteady but clear upward 
trend and underscores the increasing attention paid to the field. This is quite similar to the 
increasing number of publications in the field of EO in general, which began in the 1980s and 






































































































































Figure 3: Number of publications per year 
Since 1980, privatization has been the dominant global trend in the world and as such 
has been in the spotlight of research (Bernier, 2011), but that is not the subject of the present 
literature review. Since the mid-2000s, extensive re-municipalization has occurred in different 
countries, for example in Germany (Hall et al., 2013). Many public enterprises can be found in 
the energy sector (e.g., Hall et al., 2013; Millward, 2011; Vavouras, 1996), while 
simultaneously there is a downward trend of governmental ownership in the 
telecommunications sector (Schmitt, 2011). With regard to geographical analysis, most articles 
focus on western and northern Europe and New Zealand, although the phenomenon is widely 
based in the western world. 
As indicators for the quality of the publishing outlets in question (Booth et al., 2012), 
the SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016 and the Thomson Reuters Journal Citation Reports 




covers 27 of the 30 journals, ranging from 0.206 to 2.733. The JCR covers 19 of the 30 journals 
with IF ranging from 0.739 to 3.875. Therefore, many articles in question were published in at 
least middle-ranked journals (Bouncken et al., 2015). The fragmentation of the topic becomes 
obvious when one considers the number of different journals in which the articles were 
published. The dominant journal is the Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics (n = 5). 
The remaining 35 articles were published in 29 different journals, mainly serving the areas of 
economics and management. 
The methods applied in the articles are as fragmented as the journals publishing them. 
Most of the articles rely on qualitative (n = 16) and conceptual approaches (n = 16), followed 
by quantitative methods (n = 8). An overview of the empirical papers (including information 
about research designs, sample sizes, and examined countries) is provided in the appendix (see 
appendix of Section 2). 
The preceding remarks in conjunction with the limited presence of articles in highly 
ranked journals and the small number of quantitative approaches suggest limited robust theory 
development, and imply that the topic is underrepresented in the body of literature. 
2.5 Results: A framework of determinants related to entrepreneurial orientation 
in public enterprises 
The current state of the literature can be described as complex, nontransparent, loosely 
coupled, and to a certain degree incomplete. Viewed in this light, it is important to connect the 
different determinants to develop a comprehensive framework that fosters the understanding of 
the determinants and their interrelationships. Figure 4 provides the framework that runs as a 
common thread through the review, structuring the results in the following section. Some 
elements of the framework were adapted and refined from the work of Smith (2014) and the 
first conceptual model of PE of Kearney et al. (2007), thus offering a more extensive and 
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Figure 4: Review framework 
The framework highlights the public enterprise embedded in the (external) environment 
composed of both market and political and institutional factors (see Figure 4). On a corporate 
level, governing body and organizational design are illustrated as two separate determinants. 
On the individual level, the managers and employees are the innermost determinant of a public 
enterprise. Especially on the corporate and the individual level, explicit comparisons with 
private-sector counterparts can be identified. It should be noted that the proposed framework 
serves as a starting point from which to acquire a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of 
public enterprises in terms of its EO. It does not claim to provide a complete and sharp picture 
of the subject because the approach adopted cannot guarantee to identify all relevant factors. 
2.5.1 (External) Environment 
With reference to the research framework (Figure 4), the EO and resulting outcomes 




Market factors. The consideration of market factors is one central difference between 
contemporary public enterprises and other organizations in the public sector (e.g., Bernier, 
2014; Florio, 2014). Schmitt (2011) states that competition is not a cause of privatization, but 
a consequence of the same underlying process. Smith (2012, 2014) found that public enterprises 
are stimulated by the market factors munificence3, dynamism, and hostility; a finding in line 
with the hypothesis of Kearney & Meynhardt (2016). Kearney et al. (2010) examined 134 
public-sector organizations in Ireland and found a positive relationship between munificence 
and renewal. Renewal mediates the relationship between munificence and performance (that is, 
growth and also development) (Kearney et al., 2013). Additionally, the same paper states that 
the less munificent the environment, the more hostile it becomes. The authors also argue that 
the performance outcomes from proactive investments in munificent environments can be 
evaluated more accurately (Kearney et al., 2013). Kearney & Morris (2015) state that 
environmental munificence positively affects the performance of the public-sector 
organizations. Their hypothesis that hostility negatively affects the performance was not 
supported (Kearney & Morris, 2015). It is important to note that all three studies seem to use 
the same dataset (Kearney et al., 2010; Kearney et al., 2013; Kearney & Morris, 2015). With 
reference to the mixed sample of the different public-sector organizations, possible differences 
were examined by conducting an analysis of variance, and no overall differences were found. 
Interestingly, Kearney et al. (2010) and Kearney et al. (2013) do not specify renewal as a 
consequence of EO, but as one of the dimensions of corporate entrepreneurship, while Kearney 
& Morris (2015) define strategic renewal as a form of entrepreneurship. 
Not only direct competition but also cooperation with private companies are emphasized 
by public enterprises as they provide financial resources and knowledge that can be directed 
toward specific projects, thus fostering PE (Smith, 2014). The physical proximity of the partners 
is closely linked to the cooperation (Smith, 2014). 
In sum, most of the literature indicates that the market factors under discussion are 
positively associated with PE; nevertheless, the role of a hostile environment in particular is not 
 




wholly clear. In this section, one has to interpret the findings critically, because some 
organizations do not follow the definition of the present paper, for example in terms of 
quasi-markets. 
 
Political and institutional factors. The interference of politics and institutions is 
interpreted differently in the public and private sectors. The state’s position is characterized by 
role conflicts arising from the state being both owner and regulator, and even between different 
regulators. As a regulator, its task is to strengthen competition between the different market 
players (Rentsch & Finger, 2015). 
With reference to PE, Kearney et al. (2007, 2008, 2009)4 propose that it is more 
positively related to organizational performance5 among public-sector organizations that can 
adapt and change with the political environment. However, Kearney et al. (2010) found no 
positive associations between political adaptability or increased environmental complexity and 
renewal. This finding is in line with those of Kearney et al. (2013), whose study could not 
establish that renewal mediates the relationship between the political environment and 
performance (that is, growth and also development). While Gooneratne & Hoque (2016) and 
Smith (2014) state that external institutions and industry regulations may foster entrepreneurial 
activities, Bernier (2014) suggests the public sector is a poor institutional environment for 
entrepreneurship. Specifically, the paper claims that the public sector has too many rules or is 
too risk averse to offer opportunities to entrepreneurs (Bernier, 2014). An example is offered 
by Sundin (2011), whose case study reports that the law forbids public enterprises from 
competing outside the territory of their public (co-)owner. Accordingly, the public enterprise is 
highly dependent on the public legal framework (Rentsch & Finger, 2015). 
Some authors indicate that external institutions can stimulate entrepreneurial activities 
in a public enterprise, while others report the opposite effect. This mainly refers to the law 
governing each public enterprise. At the same time, it remains unclear how public enterprises 
can manage the ongoing complexity in terms of their own adaptability. Lobbying might be a 
 
4 Kearney et al. (2009) take public and private sector organizations into all of their propositions. 
5 Organizational performance incorporates development and productivity (Kearney et al., 2007, 2009) and 




key activity in setting out a convenient environment for public enterprises, especially because 
of their political interdependence. 
2.5.2 Public enterprise 
The research framework extracted in Figure 4 illustrates that the relevant determinants 
in the case of public enterprises are the governing body, the organizational design, and the 
managers and employees, although there can be some overlap and ambiguity, especially in 
terms of objectives. 
2.5.2.1 Governing body 
Objectives. The governing body can be seen as a link between the political, and thus the 
external sphere, and the public enterprise itself. As outlined in the definition of public 
enterprises, such organizations have to meet mixed and sometimes unclear objectives (Florio, 
2014). Weber et al. (2014) note that while economic aims are important aspects of many public 
services, the overall aim is to create public value, a finding in line with Hauge et al. (2008), 
who reject their hypothesis that city administrations do have the classic profit motive when they 
decide whether to provide telecommunications services. Other authors propose that public 
enterprises are expected to make profits almost as if they were in the private sector (Bernier, 
2011; Luke et al., 2011). Furlong (2015), whose multiple case study applies to the theories of 
urban entrepreneurialism, concludes that the more a public enterprise is focused on creating 
social value, the more its geographical focus differs from that of an enterprise with (solely) 
commercial objectives. Furlong (2015) also states that the often conflictual mix of social and 
commercial entrepreneurial activity within public enterprises is guided by state policy, a finding 
in line with those of Gooneratne & Hoque (2016), Bernier (2011), and Smith (2014). The last 
small case study underscores those remarks by referring to board meetings where the 
discussions can be more political than business oriented (Smith, 2014). 
In general, the multiple objectives range from cross-subsidization, namely investing the 
revenues from profitable public enterprises into utilities that are in deficit (Rentsch & Finger, 
2015) or accruing financial losses owing to undertaking projects demanded by their owner 




as the main instrument for economic policies (Vavouras, 1996), or exploring options for oil and 
natural gas reserves and estimating yields, and safeguarding national defense (Millward, 2011). 
These objectives might differ between local and national/transnational public enterprises, 
mainly in terms of their public mission objectives (Florio, 2013). 
In short, various public mission objectives seem to influence the EO and outcomes of 
the public enterprise. It is not possible to say whether the influence of those multiple, 
nontransparent, and inconsistent objectives is positive or negative, but a clear linkage to the 
public choice theory and the underlying motives of the bureaucrats and politicians can be 
identified (see Table 2). 
 
Interference as owner. Bernier (2011) links the objectives of the owner closely to its 
inference by citing the principal-agent relationship and asking whether the strategic objectives 
of the managers differ from what the government wants them to do. Vavouras (1996, p. 275) 
describes public enterprises as “battlefields of diverse sociopolitical groups” and therefore the 
specific characteristics of their management as the most important factor curtailing economic 
efficiency. 
Florio & Fecher (2011) question whether greater autonomy granted to public enterprises 
changes their performance, while numerous authors state that managerial autonomy stimulates 
entrepreneurship (e.g., Bernier, 2011, 2014; Luke et al., 2011; Ramamurti, 1986; Rentsch & 
Finger, 2015; Smith, 2012; Vining & Weimer, 2016). Accordingly, the performance of public 
enterprises cannot simply be explained by ownership (e.g., Florio, 2013; Vavouras, 1996). 
Bernier (2011) notes that public enterprises even create subsidiaries that very often escape from 
government control to a greater extent than the original public enterprise could. This can be 
underlined with the quantitative study of Smith (2012), who tried to measure the managerial 
autonomy of the CEO with a single statement. Smith (2012, 2014) and Smith & Umans (2015) 
state that, in general, public enterprises enjoy greater autonomy than local administrations, but 
it is important to note that the studies of Smith (2012) and Smith & Umans (2015) seem to use 
almost the same dataset. With regard to political composition and long board tenure, the small 




board size restrained PE, and having a power group (including a chairperson, vice-chairperson, 
and a working committee) stimulated PE in public enterprises (Smith, 2014). While nearly all 
authors see greater autonomy in conducting routine business as an essential spur to acting 
entrepreneurially, interference in terms of financial support is acceptable in the enterprise’s 
view (Ramamurti, 1986; Rentsch & Finger, 2015). Rentsch & Finger (2015, p. 636) provide 
additional motives for a close or distant relationship from the state’s perspective: “[A] close 
relation is desirable in order to ensure the stable provision of universal services, control 
politically and strategically important sectors and critical infrastructures, implement policy 
objectives, meet geopolitical objectives and receive dividends as return on investment. A distant 
relationship is required to avoid bearing risk and to ensure freedom in regulating the public 
sector.” 
At the same time, Rentsch & Finger (2015) observe an increasingly dynamic 
relationship between the state and its public enterprises, for example, through a power shift 
from the owner to the regulator as large, state-owned public enterprises become more 
autonomous. Hall et al. (2013) identify partially contradictory findings regarding the 
re-municipalization of the energy sector in Germany. The most important factors for this 
process on a local level have been a greater degree of control and effective delivery of public 
service objectives. 
Overall, it is unclear under which constraints this complex, potentially conflictual 
relationship between the public enterprise and its owner has a positive or negative effect on PE 
and organizational performance. Nevertheless, greater autonomy seems to have a positive effect 
on entrepreneurial activities. One process that remains unclear is the power shift toward more 
autonomy versus more control of local authorities regarding re-municipalizations. 
2.5.2.2 Organizational design 
Objectives. As already stated in the preceding section, public enterprises address 
multiple objectives in their routine operations. Notwithstanding that public enterprises are more 
profit-driven than in the past (Bernier, 2014; Rentsch & Finger, 2015), most authors state that 




Bernier, 2011; Luke & Verreynne, 2006a, 2006b). However, Cafferata (2010) states that in the 
Italian context the conditions of the management of the biggest public enterprises are strictly 
oriented to the enterprise’s rentability, without any strict public aims. Interestingly, Hauge et 
al. (2008) reject the notion that public enterprises are motivated by profit in the same way as 
their private-sector counterparts in a quantitative study. Both Smith (2012, 2014) and Smith & 
Umans (2015) find a middle way between the different statements by saying that the business 
and economic orientation of public enterprises dominates any social welfare orientation. With 
direct reference to PE, Smith (2012) analyzes her survey data and concludes that public service 
objectives are positively related to entrepreneurship in the public enterprise, and later supports 
those results with a small case study (Smith, 2014). 
To sum up, the multiplicity of goals seems to influence the EO and the economic success 
of the public enterprise. It remains unknown whether those goals exert a positive or negative 
influence and which goal is the most important in which context (e.g., the industrial sector the 
public enterprise operates within). 
 
Characteristics. Under the broad heading of characteristics, one can subdivide the topic 
into the interrelated areas of control, decision-making, and structure. 
Several authors propose that the extent of PE will be more positively related to 
organizational performance among public-sector organizations with less formal control systems 
and more flexible and decentralized decision-making than among public-sector organizations 
with highly formal control systems and rigid, centralized decision-making (Kearney et al., 2007, 
2008, 2009). Kearney et al. (2010) found some evidence that a flexible control system and 
decentralized decision-making can be positively associated with renewal. Kearney & Morris 
(2015) showed that control systems with moderate levels of formality, tightness, and discretion 
and also decentralized decision-making are positively associated with strategic renewal but not 
with growth and development. Additionally, their hypotheses that strategic renewal will 
mediate the associations between the control system and also between the decision-making 
characteristics and organizational performance were not supported (Kearney & Morris, 2015). 




entrepreneurial strategic vision is positively associated with work discretion/autonomy within 
the public enterprise. Smith (2014) relates the speed of the decision-making process to the 
degree of autonomy from the governing body, and established via a small case study that PE 
was stimulated when the public enterprise has a less hierarchical structure, thus supporting the 
notion of Kearney et al. (2007). However, Kearney et al. (2010) found no support for a positive 
association between the public sector’s organic structure/low formalization and renewal. 
To summarize, the very limited literature indicates that a more flexible control system 
and decentralized decision-making is positively associated with PE and renewal. A less 
hierarchical structure might be positively associated with PE. 
2.5.2.3 Managers and employees 
Objectives and motives. On the individual level, Ramamurti (1986) identifies the main 
objectives and motives of managers and employees, and can therefore provide a starting point 
in the literature. The conceptual paper identifies differences and similarities between private 
and public entrepreneurs. A key finding relates to the economic perspective: public 
entrepreneurs are more indifferent to personal monetary gain than their private counterparts 
(Ramamurti, 1986). In his view, public and private entrepreneurs seek profits for their 
enterprise, even though the public entrepreneur seeks the resources to pursue non-commercial, 
social goals (Ramamurti, 1986). This is taken as a foundation by many authors who see personal 
goals and objectives as less important than the generation of a good result for the public 
enterprise (Kearney et al., 2007, 2009, 2010) and society as a whole (Cohen & Muñoz, 2015; 
Mbecke, 2016). Interestingly, Cohen & Muñoz (2015) link these entrepreneurs to social and 
sustainable entrepreneurs. However, very little is known about the motivation mechanisms of 
managers and employees in public enterprises (Florio, 2013, 2014), as demonstrated by the 
results of the following research. Kearney et al. (2007, 2008, 2009) suggest that the extent of 
PE is more positively related to organizational performance among public-sector organizations 
employing high rewards and motivation than among public-sector organizations with low 
rewards and motivation. Smith (2014) found empirical support for any form of compensation 




Italian state-entrepreneur are strictly oriented to the enterprise’s rentability. Arellano et al. 
(2013) conducted survey-based research in Brazil and reported that the most important values 
for the employees in the public sector were professionalism, teamwork, knowledge, 
adaptability, and challenge; all of which were linked to the recovery or pursuit of money-related 
values. 
To sum up, the available findings on the motives of managers and employees in public 
enterprises, especially in terms of their money-related or social/nonmonetary motives, seem 
contradictory. 
 
Characteristics and skills. When public entrepreneurs act entrepreneurially, they face 
different barriers than their counterparts from the private sector. Those barriers include working 
with multiple objectives or limited managerial autonomy (Ramamurti, 1986), which might 
require the public entrepreneur to acquire political skills to overcome them (Ramamurti, 1986; 
Rentsch & Finger, 2015). They might also find that goal ambiguity fosters managerial 
discretion (Ramamurti, 1986). Interestingly, Vining & Weimer (2016) state that a public 
enterprise with multiple owners who have different goals could allow managers greater 
discretion and autonomy than would be available in other public or private enterprises as the 
managers are the only people who can resolve this tension. 
When directly comparing private and public-sector entrepreneurs, Sundin (2011) cites 
an example of both types running a similar cleaning service and states that while both operated 
in the same market, the private entrepreneur saw the decision of the municipality to buy the 
cleaning service as an opportunity, while the public entrepreneur saw that same decision as a 
threat. As a result, the public enterprise was driven out of the market by its private counterpart. 
Interestingly, and to a certain degree in contrast, the small study of Broadhurst et al. (2001) 
found publicly funded/mixed enterprises are more successful in the same market than their 
private counterparts. At the same time, not all of the public managers surveyed saw themselves 
as entrepreneurs. Focusing on the economic expertise and the private-sector working 
experience, Smith (2012) does not find support for the hypothesis that private-sector experience 




This study shows that the new commercial objectives of the public enterprise were fostered by 
employing accountants with a private-sector background. Those commercial objectives 
encouraged employees to be more commercially-focused (Sharma et al., 2014). Smith & Umans 
(2015) state that private-sector working experience is positively associated with organizational 
ambidexterity. The same study also finds evidence of a positive relationship between 
managerial entrepreneurial focus and organizational ambidexterity in public enterprises. In 
general, organizational ambidexterity seems to be higher in a public enterprise than in a local 
government administration (Smith & Umans, 2015). Focusing on the organizational culture in 
general, the empirical findings of Smith (2012) support the view that organizational culture 
related to teamwork, involvement, and managerial engagement is positively associated with PE. 
Smith (2014) indicates that working climate and leadership skills stimulate PE, and that 
entrepreneurial initiatives might originate with any employee, regardless of hierarchical level. 
Additionally, Luke et al. (2010) and Luke et al. (2011) found an open, flexible, and progressive 
culture in each of the entrepreneurial public enterprises under investigation. 
In summary, public and private entrepreneurs share many characteristics and skills. At 
the same time, they work in different environments, which becomes especially noticeable given 
the results on their success and self-perception. It remains especially unclear whether 
private-sector experience or economic expertise as such fosters PE. Additionally, the 
organizational culture seems to influence PE. 
2.5.3 Entrepreneurial orientation in the context of public enterprises 
Building on the conceptual thoughts of Ramamurti (1986), Kearney et al. (2007) 
established the first PE model and offered various proposals on EO, which were essentially 
repeated by Kearney et al. (2008, 2009). The research framework provided in Figure 4 
illustrates that all those statements argue that the extent of PE will be more positively related to 
organizational performance among public-sector organizations that (a) support and encourage 
innovation rather than restrict and restrain it, (b) facilitate moderate risk-taking rather than avoid 
risk, and (c) support and encourage proactivity rather than restrict and restrain it (Kearney et 




When testing the propositions, Kearney et al. (2010) and Kearney et al. (2013) found 
that EO did not apply to their mixed sample, and found no overall differences between the 
different public-sector organizations under investigation. However, the same authors admit that 
the limited response rate to the survey forming the basis of their study did not allow them to 
include the dimensions of EO into their study. Interestingly, Smith (2012) did find support for 
the hypothesis that public enterprises have a significantly higher propensity for 
entrepreneurship than other public organizations. This notion was later supported through a 
small case study revealing that public enterprises are affected in terms of entrepreneurship by 
four main categories of factors: the external environment, governing body, organizational 
design, and employees (Smith, 2014). 
While the framework of analysis is similar, public enterprises face different 
environmental and internal influences than do private enterprises. As a result, the stimulating 
and restraining factors differ from those of the classic private-sector context (Smith, 2012, 
2014) and fundamentally different approaches to managing and encouraging innovation, 
proactivity, and risk-taking might be needed (Kearney et al., 2009). The reasons for that include 
the fact that the public sector is notably more risk averse than the private sector (Luke et al., 
2011; Luke & Verreynne, 2006a).6 Luke & Verreynne (2006a) describe the aversion to risk 
highlighted within each organization through the cultural changes required to develop 
confidence internally, and to take on new projects. Luke et al. (2011) state that public 
enterprises that are very competent at their core business are innovative and pursue 
entrepreneurial undertakings, which suggests entrepreneurship is not inconsistent with this risk 
averse context. Kearney & Meynhardt (2016) subsequently defined EO in the public-sector 
context as more complex and multifaceted. In terms of the resulting outcomes, it remains 
unclear how non-quantifiable, multi-causal outcomes should be measured (Kearney et al., 2007, 
2009). 
 




As a whole, this section highlights that only very limited insights are available, 
supporting the view that (one-dimensional) EO is applicable to public enterprises, although 
different approaches might be required to manage and encourage the dimensions of EO. 
2.6 Discussion and research agenda 
The goal of this systematic literature review and the assembled research questions was 
to collect all the conceptual remarks and empirical evidence on entrepreneurship in 
contemporary public enterprises. Furthermore, these remarks and evidence are brought together 
in an integrative and holistic framework (Figure 4). Building on this framework and the 
subsequent analysis makes it possible to identify research gaps that can offer avenues for further 
research. Table 3 recaps the research units of the framework, the summary findings of the 
analysis, and the resulting research gaps. Additionally, the ensuing remarks are formulated on 




Table 3: Summary of research findings 
Research unit of analysis Findings Research gaps 
(External) 
Environment 
Market factors • Market factors are positively associated with PE and the 
outcomes in general. The role of a hostile environment is not 
wholly clear. 
• Need for more results on the positive impact of the market 
factors on PE. 




• Contradictory findings on the stimulating effect of external 
institutions on entrepreneurial activities of the public 
enterprise, especially in terms of the relevant law. 
• It remains unclear how public enterprises can manage the 
ongoing complexity in terms of their adaptability. 
• More research on the effects of external institutions and 
political adaptability on the EO of the public enterprise. 




Objectives • The multiple, nontransparent, and inconsistent public mission 
objectives seem to influence the EO and the outcomes of the 
public enterprise. Whether this (external) influence is 
positive or negative is unknown. 
• Lack of research on the effects of public mission objectives. 
• Lack of research on who is setting the goals, which goal is 
more important and in which context. 
• Lack of research considering the influence of the original goal 
setting on the EO. 
Interference as 
owner 
• The outcomes of the public enterprise cannot be explained 
simply by ownership. 
• It is unclear under which constraints the relationship between 
the public enterprise and its owner has a positive or negative 
effect on PE and organizational performance. 
• More autonomy seems to have a positive effect on 
entrepreneurial activities. 
• One process that remains unclear is the power shift toward 
more autonomy versus more control of local authorities 
regarding re-municipalizations. 
• Need for more results on the possible influence of the 
ownership structure on the EO. 
• Lack of research on the optimal distance between owner and 
enterprise (e.g., in terms of location and action). 
• Lack of analysis on which factors determine the relationship 
between the owner and the public enterprise. 
• Lack of analysis on what is the ideal ownership structure in 
terms of autonomy (administration; public enterprise; private 
enterprise; hybrid [multiple owners]). 
Organizational 
design 
Objectives • The multiplicity of goals seems to influence the EO and the 
economic success of the public enterprise. It is still unknown 
whether the multiple goals exert a positive or negative 
influence. 
• Lack of research on the effects of different objectives within 
the organization. 
• Lack of research on who is setting the goals, which goal is 
more important, and in which context. 
• Lack of research considering the influence of the original goal 




Table 3: Summary of research findings (continued) 
Research unit of analysis Findings Research gaps 
 
Characteristics • The literature indicates that a more flexible control system is 
positively associated with PE and renewal. 
• Decentralized decision-making might be positively 
associated with PE and renewal. 
• A less hierarchical structure might be positively associated 
with PE. 
• Lack of research on factors stimulating PE. 
• More research considering the effects of decentralized 
decision-making and flexible control systems. 
• More research investigating which structure is more 





• Apparently contradictory results on motives (monetary vs. 
social/nonmonetary). 
• Lack of research regarding the motivation, constraints, and 
innovativeness of employees and managers in conjunction 
with the EO. 
• Lack of research on the importance of profit orientation on the 




• Public and private entrepreneurs share many characteristics 
and skills; at the same time, they work in different working 
environments. 
• Working experience, skills, and the organizational culture 
seem to have an effect on the EO. 
• Organizational ambidexterity seems to be possible within 
public enterprises. 
• Lack of results on the skills now required of the public 
entrepreneur. 
• Lack of research on the influence of private-sector working 
experience versus economic expertise. 
• Lack of studies on the success of private and public 






• The one-dimensional construct of EO attracted research 
attention, but that was limited in quantity. 
• Multidimensional construct was not an explicit part of 
research in the public sector. 
• Far more research investigating the one-dimensional construct 
of EO is required. 
• Lack of research investigating the multidimensional construct 
of EO. 
• Lack of establishment of a theoretical framework or model 
with a different approach in comparison with private-sector 




This literature review clearly illustrates that public enterprises can to a certain degree 
take a hybrid form, in that they contain elements of corporate and public entrepreneurship. 
Nevertheless, research on corporate entrepreneurship has primarily been conducted in the 
private-sector context (Kearney et al., 2008, 2010), which has led to a notable research bias 
toward private-sector organizations (Smith, 2012). Accordingly, many articles in this literature 
review also rely on private-sector corporate entrepreneurship literature (e.g., Kearney et al., 
2007, 2008; Smith, 2012, 2014) which might introduce bias to the basis of frameworks or 
models. This might explain why Kearney et al. (2007) seem to limit the political antecedents of 
PE to the external environment, ignoring the governing body as a necessary internal component. 
Additionally, the model provided by Smith (2014) seems also incomplete, notably because the 
outcomes of the entrepreneurial orientation are absent. Nevertheless, Smith (2014) states that 
research on private-sector entrepreneurship can be used as a starting point for public 
entrepreneurship. The literature on public entrepreneurship is still concentrated on academic 
institutions or government organizations, consequently largely ignoring the unique 
phenomenon of public enterprises (Bernier, 2014; Luke et al., 2010). Research on public 
enterprises itself has been obfuscated by privatization processes being the dominant global trend 
and thus hogging the research limelight. As a result, a detailed theory of the unique nature of 
public enterprises would be welcome (Florio, 2014; Rentsch & Finger, 2015), and such research 
could lead to a closer linkage of public enterprises and public entrepreneurship (Bernier, 2014). 
Attempting to link the research streams of public entrepreneurship and corporate 
entrepreneurship more closely, Bernier (2014) advocates conducting empirical research. 
Interestingly, he tries to connect both research streams by referring to the conceptual thoughts 
of Kearney et al. (2008), while Kearney & Morris (2015) attempt the same in a similar way, 
referring to Bernier & Hafsi (2007) in their work. While the latter hold that actions in public 
enterprises are similar to those in large private organizations, this literature review, represented 
in particular by the work of Kearney et al. (2009) and Smith (2012, 2014), advocates different 
approaches in public and private-sector organizations, and that approaches consider different 
determinants of EO in public enterprises. Therefore, studies should not be conducted with 




phenomenon of public enterprises differs from other public entities and is more similar to that 
of private enterprises (Bernier & Hafsi, 2007; Luke & Verreynne, 2006a; Smith, 2014). 
Referring to the multidimensional construct of entrepreneurial orientation (Lumpkin & 
Dess, 1996), competitive aggressiveness and autonomy were not an explicit part of any 
research. With direct reference to the above mentioned mixed samples of public enterprises and 
other public-sector organizations, some objects under investigation were not embedded in a 
liberalized market environment. This could explain the neglect of competitive aggressiveness, 
which emphasizes outperforming market rivals (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). Autonomy played a 
significant role in the literature review, specifically in the context of the interference of the 
owner. Smith (2012) tried to measure autonomy with a single statement, which was not 
embedded in a multidimensional construct. 
This interference directly leads to the research stream of new institutional economics 
(see Section 2.2). Principal-agent theory has been the focus of discussion, mainly relating to the 
objectives of the different roles (state as an owner and regulator, the public enterprise itself, and 
the individuals), which have been discussed at length: these objectives were unclear, only 
partially overlapping and thus potentially conflictual, leading to excessive regulation of the 
public enterprise. The political objectives in particular link the phenomenon to aspects of public 
choice theory. 
Therefore, the author calls for a research stream less reliant on private-sector literature. 
This can only be achieved by using qualitative studies for theory development that are in line 
with the exact definition of public enterprises. Accordingly, the adaption of the 
multidimensional construct of entrepreneurial orientation warrants major attention, especially 
in a liberalized market environment and the context of the profit orientation of public 
enterprises. 
2.7 Limitations 
This literature review has shed light on the determinants of entrepreneurship in public 
enterprises, but it necessarily has some limitations. First, the review focused on peer-reviewed 




of Science databases. However, by following Podsakoff et al. (2005) and Keupp et al. (2012) 
and conducting extensive reference checks, the author believes the associated risks have been 
limited and the quality of the findings simultaneously improved in such a way as to create a 
more holistic view of the current literature. Second, the information content of the literature 
reviewed is sometimes inadequate, especially when the paper fails to report whether the 
examined cases follow the developed definition of public enterprises. The selection process for 
these papers was based on the criterion of their being fit for purpose (Boaz & Ashby, 2003; 
Pawson, 2006). In addition, it is still not possible to guarantee that some public enterprises 
according with the stated definition were a subject of investigation in other entrepreneurship 
literature, such as that focusing on the private sector. Third, it proved impossible to make 
sharper distinctions between some of the determinants (e.g., the objectives of organizational 
design and the governing body). This was because the quality of the information sources in this 
context is sometimes inadequate, which forced the author to assign statements of the authors to 
the most likely determinant. 
2.8 Conclusion 
Over the past decades and even today, the research streams focusing on public 
entrepreneurship with the focal phenomenon of public enterprises and corporate 
entrepreneurship have been only loosely connected. Accordingly, this structured literature 
review was conducted to illustrate future paths of research. It generates promising insights into 
the focal phenomenon of public enterprises and its EO. First, the literature on privatization has 
dominated research, leading to a neglect of contemporary public enterprises, notwithstanding 
that these enterprises are omnipresent in today’s global economy. This might explain the fact 
that the entrepreneurship literature in the public sector has largely focused on government 
organizations and academic institutions. Second, the research concentrating on corporate 
entrepreneurship was primarily conducted in the private-sector context, which has led to a bias 
in this literature stream. 
The literature attempts to link both research streams, while lacking a holistic view of 




synthesis of prior research indicates a lack of theoretical grounding. Hence, the author 
developed an integrative and organizing framework (Figure 4), offering a holistic view on the 
topic. It is time to emerge from the shadows of the biased literature and to clarify the thus far 
opaque research area by establishing a more self-reliant research stream. The first move has 





Appendix of Section 2 
Table A1: Definitions of a public enterprise (and synonyms) in the reviewed literature 
Author(s) Definition of a public enterprise 
Florio & Fecher 
(2011, pp. 369–370) 
“…an entity controlled by government but operating with a large amount of discretion 
and serving a market will be considered a ‘public corporation’. A public corporation 
in general is a ‘legal entity set up for the purpose of producing goods or service for the 
market so that its owner may make a profit’, thus both public and private corporations 
are considered similar species, both earn their income mostly through ‘sales’, but differ 
for their ownership structure.” 
Luke et al. (2011, 
p. 322) 
“New Zealand’s SOEs [state-owned enterprises] are government-owned but 
commercially-focused organisations, operating in deregulated markets.” 
Millward (2011, 
p. 378) 
“…enterprises owned by nation states and their local governments which were selling 
goods and services under the broad constraint to break even financially. Health, 
education and related services are therefore excluded.” 
Kearney et al. (2013, 
p. 338) 
“Public sector state and semi-state enterprises included all government departments 
and commercial business that are beneficially owned either fully or partially by 
the…Government.” 
Florio (2014, p. 201) 
“Public enterprises…can be defined as economic organizations: (a) ultimately owned 
or co-owned by national or local government, (b) internalizing a public mission among 
their objectives, (c) enjoying full or partial budgetary autonomy, (d) exhibiting a 
certain extent of managerial discretion, (e) operating mainly in a market environment, 
and (f) for which (full) privatization would in principle or de facto be possible, but for 
some reasons it is not a policy option.” 
Gooneratne & Hoque 
(2016, pp. 58–59) 
“…hybrid state-owned entities (SOEs) are government-owned businesses which carry 
out their operations with a commercial outlook. …[They] operate with the coexistence 
of social and commercial aims, which make them different from their counterparts in 













4 private enterprises, 9 publicly 
funded/mixed-mode telecottages (approximately 
3 public enterprises) 
United 
Kingdom 




3 public enterprises: MetService, NZ Post, 
Quotable Value 
New Zealand 
Luke & Verreynne 
(2006b) 
Case study 
3 public enterprises, but only one in detail 
(MetService) 
New Zealand 
Hauge et al. (2008) 
Analysis of 
archival data 
Dataset of the U.S. telecommunications market 





Italian economy: 20 biggest companies in Italy, 
thereof approx. 1 public enterprises (in 2008): 
Ferrovie dello Stato 
Italy 
Kearney et al. 
(2010) 
Survey 134 public organizations Ireland 
Luke et al. (2010) 
Multiple case 
study 
3 public enterprises: MetService, NZ Post, 
Quotable Value 
New Zealand 
Luke et al. (2011) 
Multiple case 
study 




(Public) Enterprises in Western Europe, Japan 





Dataset of 18 OECD countries for the period 






1 public enterprise, 1 private enterprise Sweden 
Smith (2012) Survey 
74 local government administrations and 34 
public enterprises 
Sweden 
Arellano et al. 
(2013) 
Survey 137 employees of public enterprises Brazil 
Hall et al. (2013) 
Two case 
studies 
French water market, German energy market 
France, 
Germany 
Kearney et al. 
(2013) 
Survey 
Private enterprises: 51 in the United States, 141 in 




Sharma et al. 
(2014) 






1 local government administration, 1 public 
enterprise 
Sweden 
Weber et al. (2014) 
Multiple case 
study 
4 public-private innovation networks in services, 
public enterprises as actors 
Austria, 
Norway 










2 public enterprises (Empresas Públicas de 
Medellín, Waterleidingmaatschappij Drenthe) 
Colombia, 
Netherlands 
Kearney & Morris 
(2015) 













3 public enterprises (La Poste, Deutsche Bahn, 





Smith & Umans 
(2015) 
Survey 













3. Barriers to entrepreneurship in public enterprises: Boards 
contributing to inertia 
Author: Timo Tremml 
Status and reference: This section is based on the original publication of Tremml (in press), 
currently appearing in: Public Management Review, which can be found at the following 
address: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14719037.2020.1775279. An earlier 
version titled “Entrepreneurship in public enterprises: The case of German municipally-owned 
energy suppliers” was presented at the G-Forum 2018 in Stuttgart, Germany. 
Abstract: This article utilizes a comparative causal mapping approach to enlarge knowledge of 
the interrelated barriers to public entrepreneurship and the outcomes of such entrepreneurship. 
The results highlight clear differences between the sales segment and the distribution grid 
segment of German public enterprises that should prompt a refined perspective on 
entrepreneurship in the public sector. Remarkably, besides intraorganizational barriers and 
those interfering from the external environment, results also show that a public enterprise’s 
supervisory board can impede its progress. This article thus contributes to recent discussion on 
governance and entrepreneurship by revealing a feature that could distinguish public from 
private enterprises. 
Keywords: causal mapping, governance, public enterprise, public entrepreneurship 
Acknowledgments: The author is grateful for the feedback provided by Andreas Kuckertz 
(University of Hohenheim), Sabine Löbbe (Reutlingen University), and the two anonymous 
referees. In addition, I am grateful for the valuable comments provided by the participants of 
the 22nd G-Forum in Stuttgart, Germany. Research for this paper was financed by the Ministry 




4. Uncovering a negative effect of minority shareholders’ board 
networking activity on entrepreneurial orientation in public 
enterprises 
Authors: Timo Tremml, Sabine Löbbe, and Andreas Kuckertz 
Status and reference: This section is based on the manuscript which is currently under review 
at C-ranked journal according to VHB-JOURQUAL 3. An earlier version titled “Board 
behavior and entrepreneurial orientation in public enterprises: Source of inertia or driver for 
change?” was presented at the G-Forum 2019 in Vienna, Austria. 
Abstract: Public enterprises find themselves in increasingly competitive markets, a situation 
that makes having an entrepreneurial orientation (EO) an urgent need, given that EO is an 
indispensable driver of performance. Therefore, it is important to understand the central but 
unclear role of the public-sector board of directors (BoD) into EO. We draw on 
stakeholder-agency theory (SAT) and resource dependence theory (RDT) and use structural 
equation modeling (SEM) to investigate survey data collected from 110 German energy 
suppliers that are majority government owned. Results indicate that social orientation represses 
EO, whereas BoD strategy control and BoD networking do not seem to predict EO on first 
sight. Closer analysis reveals a BoD networking–EO relationship depending on ownership 
structure. Remarkably, we find that it is not the usually suspected local municipal owner who 
hinders EO in our sample organizations but minority shareholders engaging in board 
networking activities. The results shed light on the intersection of governance and 
entrepreneurship with special reference to the fine-grained conceptualization of RDT. 
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, public enterprise, SEM, board, governance 
Acknowledgments: The authors are grateful for the valuable comments provided by the 
participants of the 23rd G-Forum in Vienna, Austria. Research for this paper was financed by 




Uncovering a negative effect of minority shareholders’ board networking 




Public enterprises find themselves in increasingly competitive markets, a situation that 
makes having an entrepreneurial orientation (EO) an urgent need, given that EO is an 
indispensable driver of performance. Therefore, it is important to understand the central but 
unclear role of the public-sector board of directors (BoD) into EO. We draw on 
stakeholder-agency theory (SAT) and resource dependence theory (RDT) and use structural 
equation modeling (SEM) to investigate survey data collected from 110 German energy 
suppliers that are majority government owned. Results indicate that social orientation represses 
EO, whereas BoD strategy control and BoD networking do not seem to predict EO on first 
sight. Closer analysis reveals a BoD networking–EO relationship depending on ownership 
structure. Remarkably, we find that it is not the usually suspected local municipal owner who 
hinders EO in our sample organizations but minority shareholders engaging in board 
networking activities. The results shed light on the intersection of governance and 




Beside heroic stories of private-sector entrepreneurs, the public sector remains largely 
unrecognized as an essential entrepreneurial actor (Mazzucato, 2018; Roberts & King, 1991): 
Public enterprises commit to guarantee and improve public value while facing a permanent 
struggle with other enterprises in liberalized and increasingly competitive markets 
(Mühlemeier, 2019). That makes an entrepreneurial orientation (EO) an urgent need as it 
promotes the success and performance of organizations (Meynhardt & Diefenbach, 2012; 




than that among their private counterparts (Hinz & Ingerfurth, 2013), corroborating that barriers 
to entrepreneurial activities in the public sector remain unclear (Cinar et al., 2019). One 
“particular object of interest” deals with the behavior of the board of directors (BoD) (Hinna et 
al. 2010, p. 133). The sparse existing research focuses exclusively on private-sector corporate 
governance and indicates a positive effect on EO (e.g., Eddleston et al., 2012). Research in the 
public sector indicates a negative effect when the governmental owner closely controls its 
enterprise (e.g., Lioukas et al., 1993; Smith, 2012). Such findings are strengthened by accounts 
describing politicians as the “essence of the problem” (Sørensen, 2007, p. 1046) and indications 
of potentially conflicting objectives of social and market performance (Mühlemeier, 2019). 
Despite the societal and democratic relevance of the BoD in public enterprises (Cahan 
et al., 2005) and the intersection of governance and entrepreneurship potentially revealing 
differences in the public and private sectors (Hinna et al., 2010; Liddle & McElwee, 2019), 
empirical evidence is lacking. Therefore, the purpose of the paper is to answer the research 
question: To what extent do board behavior and social orientation predict public enterprises’ 
EO in respect of different ownership structures? 
We draw on stakeholder-agency theory (SAT) and resource dependence theory (RDT) 
when examining a primary dataset of 110 German public enterprises and contribute to the 
literature in three main ways. First, besides outstanding exceptions (e.g., Meynhardt & 
Diefenbach, 2012), public-sector studies on EO remain surprisingly scarce. We shed light on 
unknown predictors of entrepreneurial undertakings in public enterprises (Cinar et al., 2019). 
Importantly, instead of relying on the commonly used but implausible input-output model 
(Dalton et al., 1998) which refers to observable characteristics such as board size and its direct 
effect on firm performance (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Gabrielsson, 2007), we base our 
assumptions on the mediating role of board behavior and EO (Coombes et al., 2011). Second, 
although research on the relationship between the BoD and EO has recently attracted attention 
in private-sector research (e.g., Eddleston et al., 2012) this paper illuminates the little 
understood topic of board behavior and its influence on EO in public enterprises. By doing so, 
the paper reveals a missing link between BoD strategy control and EO, thus addressing the 




organization in question (e.g., Sidki & Boll, 2019; Sørensen, 2007) and leaving the predictions 
of SAT unsupported (Hill & Jones, 1992). Third, despite the relevance of RDT in the public 
sector (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Roberts & King, 1991), we support the idea for a fine-grained 
conceptualization (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). Challenging common ideas of favorable 
ownership by private-sector dominated (i.e. mixed) enterprises and interorganizational 
networks (Inoue et al., 2013; Kolloch & Reck, 2017) and underscored with potential positive 
effects of board interlocks on performance (Drees & Heugens, 2013; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), 
we reveal the board networking–EO relationship changes from positive to negative when such 
enterprises hold minority shares of the public enterprise. We therefore advance comparable 
research (e.g., Zona et al., 2018) by overcoming the limitations of input-output modeling. 
4.2 Theoretical framework and hypotheses development 
4.2.1 The role of entrepreneurial orientation in public enterprises 
While the academic discussion about public enterprises has undergone a recent revival, 
research on the phenomenon remains scarce (Bernier & Reeves, 2018). We build our reasoning 
relying on the ideas of corporatization (Erakovic & Wilson, 2005) and define public enterprises 
as those more than 50% owned by government but that are a separate legal entity. They have 
financial motives among others (e.g., a social responsibility to sustain and improve public 
value) and compete with enterprises in liberalized markets. The current research accounts for 
emerging trends in the public sector (Kolloch & Reck, 2017) and endeavors to clearly define 
the sample’s boundaries (Miller, 2011). Consequently, it challenges the outdated view of public 
sector being an entity (Liddle & McElwee, 2019), for example by accounting for minority 
shareholdings of other enterprises like hub firms enabled by corporatization. Lacking a clear 
definition of networks (Provan et al., 2007), we define hub firms as enterprises that set up an 
interorganizational network and find themselves in the middle of it (Jarillo, 1988; Kolloch & 
Reck, 2017). They hold minority shares in members of their network and engage in knowledge 





Public enterprises’ focal situation with high levels of social responsibility and an 
increasingly hostile environment requires the enhancement of an organization’s EO (Covin & 
Slevin, 1989). EO is a firm-level strategic posture with an essential growth orientation (Covin 
& Slevin, 1989; Dess & Lumpkin, 2005). It describes how innovatively and proactively an 
enterprise operates with respect to business-related risk propensity (Covin & Slevin, 1989; 
Miller, 1983). Innovativeness encapsulates the pursuit of and ability to produce innovations, 
resulting, for example, in product introductions as an act of new entry (Covin & Miller, 2014). 
This includes not only the amount of new lines of products and services but also potentially 
radical and disruptive changes of products and service lines (Covin & Slevin, 1989). 
Proactiveness is about anticipating and shaping future needs as well as being ahead of 
competitors in terms of introducing novel products instead of simply imitating the actions of 
competitors (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Lumpkin & Dess, 2001). Accordingly, active new entry is 
an essential part of behaving proactively and seizing opportunities (Lumpkin & Dess, 2001). 
Risk-taking is about undertaking bold actions with a chance of very high returns instead of 
taking cautious incremental steps toward achieving a firm’s objectives (Covin & Slevin, 1989). 
By seizing potential opportunities, firms accept the risk of failure in terms of potentially costly 
wrong decisions (Covin & Slevin, 1989). 
Scholars recently started to interpret EO as a form of corporate entrepreneurship (CE) 
as a high incidence of entrepreneurial events indicates firms have a strong EO (Covin & Wales, 
2019). While both concepts are closely related, EO as an organizational attribute is a behavioral 
construct, while CE can be defined as an activity within the organization (Covin & Wales, 
2019). Overall, EO mediates the relationship between the organization’s environment and its 
performance (Rosenbusch et al., 2013) by promoting ambidextrous innovations (Kollmann & 
Stöckmann, 2014). 
Although firms with a strong EO benefit from improving financial and non-financial 
outcomes (Rauch et al., 2009), the predictors of EO in the public sector differ from those 
affecting the private sector (Meynhardt & Diefenbach, 2012; Morris & Jones, 1999; Smith, 




entrepreneurship in public enterprises, which underscores that public governance-related 
determinants merit more investigation (Cinar et al., 2019). 
4.2.2 The role of corporate governance in the public sector 
With regard to public enterprises’ corporatization process, the general requirement of 
corporate governance is a result of the separation of ownership and control (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). The board is in theory in a strong position to limit managerial actions that might be 
detrimental to shareholders expectations, resulting in enhanced firm performance (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Westphal, 1999). While most of the work on corporate governance relies on this 
narrow agency perspective (Boivie et al., 2016), recent research discusses the modification of 
traditional agency theory by suggesting the BoD’s (political) self-interests as a potential barrier 
to organizational change (e.g., Hoppmann et al., 2019; Smith, 2014). Interweaving an agency 
and stakeholder perspective leads to the political role of a BoD being to determine the goals 
and policies of the public enterprise (Hinna & Scarozza, 2015). The SAT relaxes some 
assumptions of traditional agency theory while SAT is concerned with the relationship between 
the stakeholders and the enterprise rather than merely with the (narrow) relationship between 
the shareholders and the firm (Hill & Jones, 1992). Another modification considers the 
short-run disequilibrium through market adjustment processes characterized by friction that 
enable the inclusion of theories of power like RDT (Hill & Jones, 1992), which is especially 
relevant in the public sector (Lioukas et al., 1993; Roberts & King, 1991). The concept of RDT 
deals with an organization’s interaction with its environment to reduce external dependencies 
through networking and legitimization activities (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and the theory has 
attracted substantial approbation for its predictions in the field of organizational research (Drees 
& Heugens, 2013). Combining SAT and RDT was recently suggested as offering a “powerful 
conceptual [foundation] that can be used to address issues of board governance in 
entrepreneurship research” (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2017, p. 53). 
Following this line of argumentation, these remarks fit public-sector concepts of 
corporate governance which is extended by democratic legitimation and public service 




includes public enterprises in liberalized markets as they perform services via separate 
companies that are more independent from the state than classic government agencies 
(Mühlemeier, 2019). To ensure the democratic control and legitimize the enterprise 
democratically (Klausen & Winsvold, 2021), the public shareholders nominate board members 
who represent politics and public administration to the board, according to the shares in the 
enterprise and shareholder agreement. Accordingly, the board in our sample is likely to be 
mainly composed of local politicians and also to act as an intermediary between the citizens (as 
the ultimate (majority) owner of the enterprise [Blankart, 1983]) and the enterprise itself, 
represented by its management (Hinna et al., 2010). Furthermore, PCG deals with different 
logics in public enterprises (Olsen et al., 2017), especially the fulfilling of social and market 
performance (Mühlemeier, 2019). 
Public enterprises are in a striking dilemma in which they are both expected to act 
entrepreneurially and innovate, while at the same time potentially hindered by close monitoring 
and political/social objectives (Greer et al., 2003). To investigate the unclear relationship 
between entrepreneurship and local politics, we examine the promising but little understood 
topic of board behavior relating to networking and strategy control and public enterprises’ 
social orientation as predictors of EO. We embed our model in the context of the study of 
corporatization that enables minority shareholdings by other enterprises. Therefore, ownership 
structure serves as an indicator of board capital/composition (Li, 1994; Mizruchi, 1996) while 
also directly predicting board behavior (Desender et al., 2013; Hideto Dato et al., 2020). The 





















Figure 5: Theoretical model 
4.2.3 Board behavior predicting entrepreneurial orientation in the context of 
corporatization 
4.2.3.1 The role of local public ownership in board strategy control 
In general, the local governmental owner has an increasing interest in and duty to pursue 
responsible business development and to encourage entrepreneurial thinking in its enterprise 
(Meynhardt & Diefenbach, 2012). In line with this development, the relevance of BoDs’ 
behavior as a key factor in board’s performance is no longer only recognized in the private 
sector, but also in the public sphere (Cahan et al., 2005). Both aspects indicate that differences 
in ownership might be irrelevant to board behavior. This means that a modern BoD of a public 
enterprise in a liberalized market is likely to be largely aligned with classical models of 
corporate governance (Chambers & Cornforth, 2010), which implies that the board acts in the 
best interest of the enterprise. 
However, SAT suggests that the multiple principal-agent relationships with numerous 
stakeholders found in the public sector (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000) might increase 
coordination problems and the inertia of collective action (Hill & Jones, 1992). This issue can 
afflict BoDs with a high proportion of serving politicians at the same time: They might simply 
aim to be representative of the local voters’ perspectives and seek primarily to maintain the 
status quo, which would undermine their discharging their role to the best of their ability 




might be explained by a lack of incentives and by capacity problems (Boivie et al., 2016; Cahan 
et al., 2005; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Referring to lack of incentives, politicians might have 
little incentive to monitor the activities of the organization because they will face little scrutiny 
from local citizens. Citizens’ monitoring activities are inefficient because they have weak 
property rights and high transaction costs (Blankart, 1983; Davies, 1971). The issue of 
monitoring is a concern because citizens are reliant on the monitoring activity of the board 
owing to dispersed ownership as the citizens are the ultimate owners of the public enterprise 
(Blankart, 1983; Desender et al., 2013). Referring to capacity problems, local governmental 
owners might assign more ambiguous and potentially conflicting objectives than shareholders 
like hub firms (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). This ambiguity might reduce potential monitoring 
capacity among the politicians on the board representing local government (Boivie et al., 2016). 
Thus, we hypothesize: 
H1: Local public ownership negatively affects board strategy control. 
4.2.3.2 Board strategy control and entrepreneurial orientation 
Be it in the private or the public sector, BoD involvement in the monitoring and 
ratification of an enterprise’s activities may affect a firm’s entrepreneurial posture (Gabrielsson, 
2007). Studies on the relationship have focused exclusively on the private sector, revealing that 
a BoD’s control task is a potential positive influence on a firm’s entrepreneurial attributes 
(Deman et al., 2018; Gabrielsson, 2007; Gabrielsson & Politis, 2009; Schepers et al., 2013), for 
example, as the board challenges the top management to support innovation and increase the 
long-term valuation of the firm (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
With regard to the public sector however, board members who are local politicians have 
strong obligations to external stakeholders (Olsen et al., 2017), which might also negatively 
influence their behavior when they sit on private boards and attempt to perform a “watchdog 
role” (Huse & Rindova, 2001, p. 173). In that scenario, local politicians might not act in the 
best interests of the firm. Even though all stakeholders are assumed to have a general interest 
in the continuing existence of the firm, SAT also states that a BoD might have little incentive 




groups (Hill & Jones, 1992). Management attempts to increase their power over different 
stakeholders through extending the firm’s customer base via a diversification of products and/or 
markets might encounter resistance by the BoD as the investment demanded by diversification 
can be viewed as an inefficient use of resources (Hill & Jones, 1992). Such diversification is 
encouraged by the inherent growth orientation of EO (Dess & Lumpkin, 2005), for example, 
via the introduction of new products as an act of new entry (Covin & Miller, 2014). Therefore, 
a BoD that blocks managerial initiatives through be getting heavily involved in ratifying and 
monitoring of an enterprise’s strategy might contribute to organizational inertia and lower 
performance (Hill & Jones, 1992; Hoppmann et al., 2019; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Prior 
public-sector literature indicates that state involvement is negatively associated with 
innovativeness and performance (e.g., Bradshaw et al., 1992; Lioukas et al., 1993; Ramamurti, 
1986; Smith, 2012) and board members who were not primarily appointed because of their 
political competence were shown to positively influence the EO of public enterprises (Smith, 
2012). Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
H2: Board strategy control negatively affects public enterprises’ EO. 
4.2.3.3 The role of local public ownership in BoDs’ networking-EO-relationships 
In addition to its strategy control role, the BoD is well positioned to establish important 
links to (external) resources and stakeholders that potentially stimulate EO (Huse, 2005b; 
Miller, 2011). These links may enable the board to provide unique resource bundles that create 
a competitive advantage for the enterprise (Coombes et al., 2011; Huse & Rindova, 2001). An 
EO encompasses actions like new product introductions (Covin & Miller, 2014; Covin & 
Slevin, 1989) and early responses to potential opportunities (Lumpkin & Dess, 2001). Such 
activities often require a significant volume of resources and might involve a considerable risk 
of failure (Rosenbusch et al., 2013). Public enterprises therefore require legitimization for 
venturing, especially if the new activity is highly innovative and different in relation to previous 
products and services (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Prior private-sector 
research already indicates a slightly positive correlation of BoD service provision 




public enterprises, there might be social ties between the local politicians on the board and the 
management that improve resource delivery and the organization’s EO (Meynhardt & 
Diefenbach, 2012; Westphal, 1999). As the local BoD is encouraged to legitimate public 
enterprises’ entrepreneurial activities to its local stakeholders (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), these 
social ties on the local level might be especially helpful to those translating the resources 
directed to EO. This leads to the first part of our next hypothesis: 
H3a: Local public ownership positively moderates the relationship between the 
BoD’s networking task and a public enterprise’s EO. 
To be more specific, interorganizational relationships such as equity holdings are 
expected to lead to relational advantages and positive outcomes such as interorganizational 
learning and stable resource provision (Drees & Heugens, 2013; Kolloch & Reck, 2017; Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978). As ownership structures directly influence board composition (Li, 1994; 
Mizruchi, 1996), there might be board members appointed by minority shareholders such as 
hub firms. Board composition is suggested to be highly relevant to board interlocks, which 
occur when “a person affiliated with one organization sits on the board of directors of another 
organization” (Mizruchi, 1996, p. 271). These interlocks might support interfirm network ties 
that potentially help enterprises to reduce external resource dependency and consequently 
improve innovativeness and firm performance (Helmers et al., 2017; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
However, we argue that this does not hold true for enterprises like hub firms when serving as 
minority shareholders on the board of the focal public enterprise. Zona et al. (2018) find that 
interlocking directorates may have positive or negative effects on firm performance, depending 
on resource availability and ownership structure. These opposing effects on firm performance 
indicate that in addition to positive effects flowing from reduced resource dependency, for 
example via interfirm network ties, there might also be negative effects on firm performance. 
Those negative effects might stem from board interlocks as an instrument of corporate control 
(Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Mizruchi, 1996) or limiting enterprises’ ability to act 
autonomously by restricting a pluralist set of resource providers (Drees & Heugens, 2013). Both 
might be achieved by enabling interlocking BoDs to exert power and control over the focal firm 




encourage high levels of board networking activity to increase the resource dependence of the 
focal firm (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). As resource dependency might repress EO 
(Rosenbusch et al., 2013), we state in the second part of our hypothesis: 
H3b: The direction of the relationship between the BoD’s networking task and 
a public enterprise’s EO changes from positive to negative when other 
enterprises hold minority shares in the focal firm. 
4.2.4 Social orientation predicting board strategy control and entrepreneurial 
orientation 
4.2.4.1 Social orientation and board strategy control 
When monitoring the management of the public enterprise, public boards may have to 
consider often contradictory enterprise goals such as providing potentially unprofitable services 
of general interest (i.e. services that are crucial for life, such as public transport, in an affordable 
manner to all citizens [Mühlemeier, 2019]) while satisfying profit expectations in competitive 
markets (Mühlemeier, 2019; Olsen et al., 2017). There might be a negative effect on the BoD 
control task as the conflicting logics entail stress which can consume significant resources 
(Hinna & Scarozza, 2015). This might increase the bounded rationality of a BoD, thus reducing 
its supervision capacity (Boivie et al., 2016). 
However, the social goals like the provision of public services may shape the decisions 
enterprises make in terms of product-market strategies, leading to interventions on the part of 
the state to satisfy stakeholders’ needs (Lioukas et al., 1993). The provision of public services 
is an indicator of enterprises’ “political visibility” (Lioukas et al., 1993, p. 647) and is important 
to determine how stakeholders might be affected by the firm’s activities (Salancik, 1979). In 
this scenario, the inadequate provision of social activities (e.g., local public transport) would 
negatively affect citizens’ quality of life, leading to their increasing the monitoring of the 
actions of politicians and enterprises (Mizrahi & Minchuk, 2019). Citizens’ closer monitoring 
of politicians may also induce the latter to increase their monitoring activity of the public 




H4: Public enterprises’ social orientation positively affects board strategy 
control. 
4.2.4.2 Social orientation and entrepreneurial orientation 
While the classic desire of private shareholders is said to be the enterprise maximizing 
profits and increasing shareholder value (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000), stakeholders also set 
non-financial objectives for enterprises like increasing public value (Hill & Jones, 1992). Such 
social considerations of public enterprises are said to conflict with the basic idea of 
entrepreneurship (Bellone & Goerl, 1992) and to reduce corporate (market) performance 
(Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994) as the pursuit of diversified interests 
consumes a significant volume of resources that are necessary to increase a firm’s EO (Covin 
& Slevin, 1989; Hill & Jones, 1992). In addition to the issue of constrained resources, the 
freedom to choose specific product-market strategies to pursue innovation (Miller, 1983) is 
constrained when dealing with high levels of social orientation (Lioukas et al., 1993). 
Furthermore, any enterprise that disregards the demands of important interest groups could 
undermine the legitimacy of its entrepreneurial activities (Hill & Jones, 1992; Salancik, 1979). 
Interestingly, previous research on public enterprises finds public service objectives positively 
influencing EO (Smith, 2012), but we hypothesize: 
H5: Public enterprises’ social orientation negatively affects enterprises’ EO. 
4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Research design and sample 
Our study focuses on energy suppliers in Germany that are majority owned by the 
government. Many of these enterprises are former monopolists, but today operate in a 
liberalized energy market experiencing environmental uncertainties in terms of competitiveness 
and business transformation (Mühlemeier, 2019), for example, as a result of the German energy 
system transformation (Energiewende) that includes aspects like the switch from fossil fuels to 
renewable energy sources and digitalization (Mazzucato, 2018). Additionally, Germany has a 
high level of urban self-governance and places considerable importance on the concept of 




utilities (Mühlemeier, 2019). Consequently, the environment of these enterprises is increasingly 
hostile and therefore requires the enhancement of an organization’s EO (Covin & Slevin, 1989) 
with the BoD charged with delivering the expectations of the municipality and its citizens 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). We limit our scope because research in a specific context and on a 
particular organization type may limit generalization but increase the validity of the research 
findings (Lomberg et al., 2017; Miller, 2011). Furthermore, we question the common 
perspective of the public sector being an entity (Liddle & McElwee, 2019) despite the variety 
among public-sector organizations regarding the drivers and outcomes of entrepreneurship 
(Bysted & Hansen, 2015; Smith, 2012). Therefore, we focus on the competitive business 
segments in the energy sector. 
Primary data on public enterprises with a focus on governance and EO remains scarce 
(Daiser et al., 2017; Meynhardt & Diefenbach, 2012). In line with prior studies, we decided to 
use a single respondent study because the top management is the key informant on board 
behavior and EO, especially when boards meet relatively rarely as in the present context 
(Bauweraerts & Colot, 2017; Rauch et al., 2009; Zattoni et al., 2015). When determining the 
population, we ensured that the enterprises in question had a BoD and followed prior EO studies 
requiring a minimum of 10 employees (Arzubiaga et al., 2018; Kollmann & Stöckmann, 2014). 
We cross-checked multiple databases, leading to identifying a total of 620 enterprises. 
As data collection via a single respondent approach and in a single timeframe might lead 
to common method bias (CMB), we followed the guidelines of Podsakoff et al. (2003) and 
Podsakoff et al. (2012) as well as prior studies in this sensitive field (Minichilli et al., 2009; 
Zattoni et al., 2015). We aimed to reduce CMB at the survey design stage by (1) guaranteeing 
the respondents anonymity and confidentiality, (2) placing independent and dependent 
variables far away from each other within the survey, (3) stating clearly that there were no 
correct or incorrect answers and (4) that different opinions about the issues addressed in the 
questionnaire are possible. Additionally, we conducted 20 pretests with people from the energy 
sector (with characteristics as close as possible to the key informant), the public administration, 
and academic experts in order to fine tune the questionnaire, for example regarding a consistent 




Data collection took place from March until May 2019. We contacted each potential 
respondent or their assistant personally via phone to qualify the firm and invite the key 
informant to participate. That personal invitation secured permission to distribute 274 
questionnaires, resulting in 116 responses. After excluding questionnaires with inappropriate 
respondents and/or missing data, our final dataset consists of 110 responses (108 CEOs, two 
general managers), representing a very satisfying final response rate of 40.1%. 
After data collection, we checked for CMB using Harman’s single-factor test (Podsakoff 
et al., 2003). The largest of the identified factors accounts for only 17.2% of the variance, while 
the remaining eight account for 42.3% (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). As this test provides only a 
first indication, we conducted a full collinearity test and find no bias as all factor-level variance 
inflation factors are smaller than 3.3 (Kock, 2015; Kock & Lynn, 2012). Both tests indicate that 
CMB should not be a problem in our study. 
To check for non-respondent bias, we collected objective data via the previously used 
Bisnode database (Kollmann & Stöckmann, 2014). When Bisnode did not provide information, 
annual corporate reports were examined. Following prior studies in the field (e.g., Carpenter & 
Westphal, 2001; Deman et al., 2018), we relied on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Siegel & 
Castellan, 1988) to check for significant differences regarding firm size and CEO age between 
respondents and non-respondents. We also checked for differences in terms of enterprises’ 
headquarters/location (at the level of federal state) and form of legal entity using chi-square 
tests (Bauweraerts & Colot, 2017). Overall, we did not find significant differences between the 
two groups. 




Table 4: Sample description 




Firm size (employees) 
Between 10 and 50 employees 40 36.4 
155.79 235.51 
Between 51 and 100 employees 26 23.6 
Between 101 and 150 employees 17 15.5 
More than 150 employees 27 24.5 
Local public ownership 
50 % or less 0 0 
3.17 0.92 
Between > 50 % and < 75 % 38 34.5 
Between ≥ 75 and < 100 % 15 13.6 
100 % 57 51.8 
Respondent age 
30–39 7 6.4 
52.84 7.11 
40–49 22 20.0 
50–59 58 52.7 
60–69 23 20.9 
Respondent tenure 
Less than 5 years 32 29.1 
9.82 7.47 
Between 5 and 10 years 38 34.5 
Between 11 and 15 years 15 13.6 
More than 15 years 25 22.7 
To check for validity, self-reported measures reported in Table 4 were correlated with 
secondary data whenever possible, showing significant correlations for firm size (r = 0.993, 
p < 0.01, n = 54), local public ownership (ρ = 0.929, p < 0.01, n = 54), respondent age (r = 0.998, 
p < 0.01, n = 52), and respondent tenure (r = 0.983, p < 0.01, n = 53). The results indicate the 
validity of the self-reported measures (Kollmann & Stöckmann, 2014). 
4.3.2 Variables and measures 
All measurement scales were borrowed from previous studies (see appendix of Section 
4 for an overview of the measurement scales used). Importantly, the study measures the 
respondents’ perceptions as it mainly relies on latent variables (except for local public 
ownership and board activity). To ensure a correct translation from English to German, two 
experienced researchers followed the forward-backward translation technique advocated by 
Brislin (1970). Most items were measured on Likert-type scales. Here we used 5-point scales 
as the original 7-point scales can easily be rescaled without affecting the mean, skewness, or 




researchers want to relate variables and estimate linear relations using structural equation 
modeling (SEM) (Weijters et al., 2010), for example because of higher criterion validity. 
4.3.2.1 Independent variables 
Local public ownership. Prior studies were criticized for measuring public or private 
ownership structures dichotomously (Bruton et al., 2015) and for ignoring potential differences 
between giant state-owned enterprises and public enterprises on a more local level (Florio, 
2013). Therefore, we distinguish between a simple majority stake (>50% to <75%), a qualified 
majority stake (75 % to <100%) and full ownership (100%) by local municipalities and/or 
districts. As stated in Section 4.2, we additionally take the peculiarities of our sample and the 
findings of comparable research into account (Kolloch & Reck, 2017) and define minority 
shareholdings from other enterprises (such as other energy suppliers) as non-public—albeit they 
are potentially majority owned by government. This action ensured the research had clear 
boundaries as we rely on a specific organization type (Lomberg et al., 2017; Miller, 2011) and 
overcome the traditional and inappropriate view of the public sector representing an entity 
(Bysted & Hansen, 2015; Liddle & McElwee, 2019). 
Board networking. To measure a BoD’s ability to provide legitimacy and to establish 
important links to external resources and stakeholders for the public enterprise, we rely on the 
multi-item Likert scale anchored with fully disagree (1) and fully agree (5) provided by 
Minichilli et al. (2009) which is essentially based on the suggestion of Huse (2005a). 
Social orientation. In order to investigate the objectives of social performance against 
those relating to market performance in public enterprises (Mühlemeier, 2019), we base our 
5-point semantic differential scale on that of Lioukas et al. (1993). We addressed concerns 
reported in the literature over impaired reliability by providing a context-specific and 
unambiguous example within the construct (Lee & Duffy, 2019; Sackett & Larson, 1990). A 
higher overall score indicates greater non-commercial obligations by addressing demands 
regardless of the costs incurred and is therefore more likely to be associated with (social) public 




restrictions flowing from the enterprise being allowed to exclude unprofitable customers from 
accessing its offerings (Lioukas et al., 1993). 
4.3.2.2 Dependent variables 
Board strategy control. To measure a BoD’s ability to perform its strategy control task, 
we measured the involvement in the ratification stage and the follow up monitoring stage with 
a construct based on the board involvement in decision control scale provided by Gabrielsson 
& Winlund (2000) and validated by Gabrielsson (2007). We take the findings of Gabrielsson 
& Politis (2009) into account and focus on the strategy control perspective of the board. All six 
items were measured on a Likert scale anchored with fully disagree (1) and fully agree (5). 
Entrepreneurial orientation. To understand “what EO looks like” (Covin & Wales, 
2012, p. 681), we relied on the predominantly used second-order reflective-reflective 
Miller/Covin and Slevin construct (Covin & Slevin, 1989). We included the findings of 
Lumpkin & Dess (2001) and replaced one item on proactiveness (Typically adopts a very 
competitive “undo-the-competitors” posture) with the item A strong tendency to be ahead of 
other competitors in introducing novel ideas or products as the latter was a better fit with the 
dimension in question (Brändle et al., 2019; Kollmann & Stöckmann, 2014). In general, a 
higher overall score indicates higher EO, while lower scores indicate a more conservative 
orientation (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Green et al., 2008). Following prior research (Kollmann & 
Stöckmann, 2014), all nine items were measured using a 5-point semantic differential type 
scale. 
4.3.2.3 Control variables 
Following previous studies in the realms of board and EO research, we controlled for 
variables regularly showing explanatory power for the endogenous variables. On the 
environmental level, we controlled for hostility as prior studies showed environmental 
discontinuities to have an impact on board behavior and EO (Green et al., 2008; Lioukas et al., 
1993; Smith, 2012). Hostility was measured with the multi-item Likert scale provided by Green 
et al. (2008). On the board level, we controlled for board activity and board knowledge. Board 




(Arzubiaga et al., 2018). Board knowledge was measured with the multi-item Likert scale 
provided by Machold et al. (2011), previously validated by Minichilli & Hansen (2007). On the 
firm level, we controlled for past performance as crisis contexts in terms of bad performance 
affect board behavior and entrepreneurial undertakings (Eddleston et al., 2012; Gabrielsson, 
2007; Minichilli & Hansen, 2007). As focusing exclusively on financial outcomes would be 
inappropriate (Bruton et al., 2015), past performance was measured with a statement based on 
Caruana et al. (2002) which accounts for the overall performance of the enterprise for the last 
three years compared to other energy suppliers, therefore indicating the firm’s goals, objectives, 
and aspiration levels (Kirchhoff, 1977; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). 
4.3.2.4 Measurement model assessment 
In order to evaluate our measurement model, we first tested the reliability of the 
reflective constructs by examining ρA, composite reliability (CR), and Cronbach’s alpha (CA) 
(Hair et al., 2019). We deleted item numbers 1 and 4 of hostility to retain ρA, CR and CA values 
close to or higher than 0.7 for all constructs what indicates construct reliability (Hair et al., 
2019). Second, the average variance extracted (AVE) shows scores higher than 0.5, indicating 
convergent validity (Hair et al., 2019). Third, discriminant validity is tested via the 
Fornell-Larcker criterion (Fornell & Larcker, 1981), cross loadings, and the 
heterotrait-monotrait ratio of correlations (Henseler et al., 2015). All three tests display values 
fitting their suggested thresholds, indicating discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2019). An 
overview of reliability and AVE assessment can be found in the appendix (see appendix of 
Section 4). 
4.3.3 Analytical approach 
The analytical approach used is SEM which is appropriate when examining multiple 
cause-effect relations with latent constructs (Hair et al., 2011). Although this method features 
heavily in (private-sector) management related research (Hair et al., 2019), it is little used in 
PCG research (Daiser et al., 2017). We used partial least squares (PLS) as we rely on a 
prediction perspective of the model with early stage theory development (Hair et al., 2019; 




effects (Mitchell et al., 2008; Sirén et al., 2012). Like prior comparable studies in the field (e.g., 
Arzubiaga et al., 2018), we used SmartPLS 3 (Ringle et al., 2015), the most widely applied 
PLS-SEM software (Hair et al., 2018). We used a path-weighting scheme as our model includes 
a second-order reflective construct (Sarstedt et al., 2019). To test the significance of the paths, 
we conducted the complete and bias-corrected bootstrap procedure with 5000 subsamples (Hair 
et al., 2018). The moderator analysis is performed via a two-stage approach as suggested by 
Becker et al. (2018). Overall, our proposed model can be reasonably run with 90 cases (Chin, 
1998). The available sample size of 110 cases is consequently more than sufficient for our 
analysis (Hair et al., 2018). 
4.4 Results 
Before presenting the results of the proposed hypotheses, we offer Table 5 to display 
the correlation matrix, mean values, and standard deviations of the variables. 
Table 5: Correlation matrix, mean values, and standard deviations 
No. Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 EO -         
2 Board strategy control 0.09 -        
3 Board networking -0.12 0.33** -       
4 Local public ownership -0.07 -0.30** 0.00 -      
5 Social orientation -0.25* -0.11 -0.09 0.07 -     
6 Hostility 0.01 0.23 0.19 0.05 0.03 -    
7 Board activity 0.11 0.26* 0.04 -0.07 -0.03 0.22 -   
8 Board knowledge -0.05 0.40** 0.40** -0.11 -0.10 0.19 0.19** -  
9 Past performance 0.29** -0.18 -0.13 0.07 -0.16 0.04 -0.08 -0.02 - 
 Mean 2.59 2.42 3.03 3.17 2.62 3.69 2.37 3.38 3.77 
 SD 0.62 0.82 1.23 0.92 1.11 0.72 0.80 0.91 0.79 
Note: N = 110; 2-tailed; All latent constructs were measured on 5-point scales. 
* p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
The data reveal significant correlations between board characteristics and board 
behavior, replicating the findings of previous private-sector studies (e.g., Gabrielsson & 
Winlund, 2000; Minichilli et al., 2009). Despite suggestions in the literature, we do not find a 
significant relationship between board networking and hostility (Huse, 2007) or between 
ownership structure and EO (Hinz & Ingerfurth, 2013). However, we find a significant positive 




about in the public sphere (Liddle & McElwee, 2019) than in the private sector (Rauch et al., 
2009). 
We show the results of our tested hypotheses in Figure 6, which illustrates that that the 
model is significant with relatively high in-sample explanatory power (R² = 0.307 for board 
strategy control; R² = 0.242 for EO) (Hair et al., 2019). The Stone-Geisser-Criterion (Q²) was 
calculated via a blindfolding procedure with an omission distance of 7.0 (Tenenhaus et al., 
2005). Q² is clearly greater than zero for both endogenous variables, supporting the 



























Figure 6: Hypotheses results (one-tailed) 
The control variables hostility and board activity do not show a significant effect on 
board strategy control (hostility: path = 0.162, p = 0.11, f² = 0.035; board activity: path = 0.126, 
p = 0.09, f² = 0.021) or on EO (hostility: path = - 0.014, p = 0.45, f² = 0.000; board activity: 
path = 0.141, p = 0.08, f² = 0.023). Board knowledge has a small positive effect on board 
strategy control (path = 0.310, p < 0.01, f² = 0.127), but no significant effects on EO 




strategy control (path = - 0.165, p < 0.05, f² = 0.038) and a small positive effect on EO 
(path = 0.248, p < 0.01, f² = 0.073). 
Turning to the proposed hypotheses, our results show that local public ownership has a 
small negative effect on board strategy control (path = - 0.247, p < 0.01, f² = 0.085), supporting 
Hypothesis 1. With regard to the relationship of board strategy control and EO, we do not find 
a significant effect on EO (path = 0.167, p = 0.07, f² = 0.025), therefore there is no support for 
Hypothesis 2 with an opposite but nonsignificant direction of the hypothesized effect. The 
model shows a small positive moderation effect of local public ownership on the relationship 
between board networking and EO (path = 0.247, p < 0.05, f² = 0.077), which supports 
Hypothesis 3a. Furthermore, the direction of the relationship seems to depend on the ownership 
structure (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: The moderating effect of local public ownership on the board networking–EO relationship 
On average, that is, without the interaction term, board networking has no significant 
effect on EO (path = - 0.122, p = 0.16, f² = 0.014). For enterprises wholly owned by their local 
municipalities and/or districts, the direction of the path of board networking and EO is positive, 
whereas for public enterprises with minority shareholders in the sample the direction changes 




Regarding our two final hypotheses, our model indicates that the social orientation has 
no significant effect on board strategy control (path = - 0.092, p = 0.12, f² = 0.012), but a small 
negative effect on EO (path = - 0.226, p < 0.01, f² = 0.063). Consequently, we do not find 
support for Hypothesis 4 but do for Hypothesis 5. 
In order to account for the multiple perspectives involved in the study’s underlying 
relationship between the BoD and top management, the findings were discussed in a workshop 
in October 2019 with board members from potential minority shareholders, CEOs of the 
enterprises in question, and consultants regularly attending board meetings in this particular 
context. The aim was to ensure the face validity of the findings from a practical perspective. 
4.5 Discussion 
Public enterprises are in a striking dilemma in which they are expected to act 
entrepreneurially and innovate, while at the same time working under the potential constraints 
imposed by close monitoring and political/social objectives of local government (Greer et al., 
2003). Shedding light on this dilemma, the current article addressed the overall research 
question: To what extent do board behavior and social orientation predict public enterprises’ 
EO in respect of different ownership structures? While we find arguments for social orientation 
impairing EO similar to ideas in the prior public-sector research (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000), 
we reveal ownership structure to be an important concept predicting board strategy control and 
the board networking–EO relationship. This is a finding that has considerable implications for 
theory and practice. 
4.5.1 Implications for theory 
Our study contributes novel theoretical insights at the intersection of governance and 
entrepreneurship. With reference to the two behavioral dimensions (strategy control and 
networking), we rely on the conceptual foundation of SAT and RDT that might be capable 
theories “to address issues of board governance in entrepreneurship research” (Gabrielsson & 





First, although organizational research has found substantial support for RDT following 
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) that indicates a positive effect on performance (Drees & Heugens, 
2013), the detailed findings presented here reveal that BoD networking activity affects EO 
differently depending on ownership structure. This means that interorganizational arrangements 
like interfirm network ties and equity holdings that potentially reduce external resource 
dependency and consequently improve firm performance, as originally intended by RDT 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), might not have that power in the context studied here. We therefore 
advance the idea of a fine-grained theory of RDT (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005) by opening 
resource delivery for potential diametral effects in order to provide a deeper understanding of 
interorganizational action. To date, comparable research has relied on input-output modeling 
(e.g., Drees & Heugens, 2013; Zona et al., 2018). We overcome this limitation and advance 
theory by closely examining the relationship between board behavior and EO as relevant 
mediators. 
Second, our study also presents a new perspective on board strategy control and its 
missing link with EO in the public sector. While private-sector studies already indicate the BoD 
control task has a positive effect on entrepreneurial posture and innovativeness (Deman et al., 
2018; Gabrielsson, 2007; Gabrielsson & Politis, 2009), the public-sector research indicates a 
negative effect of a BoD composed predominantly of politicians (e.g., Sidki & Boll, 2019; 
Sørensen, 2007) and refers to a narrow state control perspective (e.g., Lioukas et al., 1993; 
Smith, 2012). Although board members nominated by the local public owners seeming to be 
less involved in ratifying and monitoring the strategy of the enterprise is a concern—on the 
grounds that public-sector reforms seek to create a modern public-sector BoD largely aligned 
with classical models of corporate governance (Chambers & Cornforth, 2010)—the missing 
link between strategy control and EO might be intentional. The board of a public enterprise is 
installed to ensure its democratic legitimization. Should the politicians on the board of public 
enterprises push the enterprise toward a more entrepreneurial posture through the exercise of 
control mechanisms as suggested in previous private-sector studies? Prior research has already 
discussed potential conflicts between democratic values (such as social orientation) and 




discussion (Liddle & McElwee, 2019). Interestingly, this is also taken account of in SAT as it 
incorporates the stakeholders’ general interest in the continuing existence of the enterprise (Hill 
& Jones, 1992). Therefore, a BoD might balance conservative and entrepreneurial orientations 
and counteract entrepreneurial intentions only up to the point where the continuing existence 
of the enterprise is not in doubt. 
4.5.2 Implications for practice 
With reference to a management perspective, entering into resource dependencies via 
minority shareholders like hub firms might represent an entrepreneurial decision of the public 
enterprise: Activities like the outsourcing of risky undertakings without clear and certain 
outcomes might be part of public enterprises’ strategy to increase long-term value and ensure 
adequate profits (OECD, 2015b) given that excessive risk-taking without stressing the other EO 
dimensions of innovativeness and/or proactiveness at the same time might be detrimental to 
performance (Kollmann & Stöckmann, 2014; Lomberg et al., 2017). 
With reference to a policy perspective, recent board codes and guidelines (e.g., for 
municipally owned enterprises in Germany [Association of German Cities, 2009] and global 
guidelines for state-owned enterprises [OECD, 2015b]) primarily adopt a monitoring 
perspective while stressing the importance of the qualification requirements for a BoD, focusing 
on board composition and size, and restating the idea of minimizing political interference. 
Importantly, and mirroring some identified gaps in academic literature (Boivie et al., 2016), the 
above guides pay little attention to multidimensional board behavior beyond common board 
practices and legal duties (such as networking activity), even though this multidimensional 
perspective might help to achieve the BoD’s goal of acting in the best interest of their public 
enterprise. Furthermore, local municipal BoDs still seem to be less involved in strategy control 
than enterprises holding minority shares, despite the former’s board activity having great 
societal and democratic relevance and citizens relying on the monitoring activity of the board 




4.5.3 Limitations and future research 
Three limitations of our study illuminate promising avenues for further research that 
will help to extend our knowledge on entrepreneurship and board practices in public enterprises. 
First, even though we avoid the limitations of input-output models that can undermine 
the behavioral approach (Dalton et al., 1998; Gabrielsson, 2007), we are aware of that the study 
measures single respondents’ perceptions of BoD behavior and EO. However, the consideration 
of multiple respondents might result in even more bias (Bauweraerts & Colot, 2017; Minichilli 
et al., 2009). We recognize that BoDs meet relatively rarely and that could limit their ability to 
develop informed perceptions of the constructs in question (Podsakoff et al., 2012; Zattoni et 
al., 2015). Further research might address this limitation by relying on ethnographic techniques, 
which would make it possible to investigate live activities and behavior inside and outside the 
boardroom on a longitudinal basis and from an individual-level perspective (Hoppmann et al., 
2019). Accordingly, and with special reference to the revealed interaction effect, it would be 
valuable to consider potential effects on minority shareholders to address the fact that the 
current research limited its investigation to one side of the relationship (Zona et al., 2018). 
Second, while this study’s approach takes top management’s perception of board 
behavior into account, we are aware of that some of the measurement scales are relatively 
untried (Boivie et al., 2016). However, we rely on previously used constructs in our study and 
take more recent findings into account (e.g., Gabrielsson & Politis, 2009). Furthermore, we 
addressed concerns over the reliability of the social orientation scale by providing a 
context-specific and unambiguous example within the construct (Lee & Duffy, 2019; Sackett 
& Larson, 1990). Nevertheless, future research might support establishing valid measurement 
scales by following the specific steps of a scale development process (Clark & Watson, 1995). 
Third, we admit that a single-industry study limits the generalizability of the findings. 
However, we follow the recent call of Miller (2011) and the EO-related findings of Lomberg et 
al. (2017) that research in a specific context and on a particular organization type may increase 
the validity of the research findings, because, for example, using samples that are too 
heterogenous might create a risk of promoting a weak understanding of the sample’s boundaries 




entrepreneurship research (Boivie et al., 2016; Lomberg et al., 2017). Following this line of 
argumentation, we address the outdated view of the public sector being a homogenous monolith 
(Liddle & McElwee, 2019) as recent research reveals remarkable differences between 
public-sector organizations regarding entrepreneurial behavior (Bysted & Hansen, 2015; Smith, 
2012, 2014). Future research in different contexts could help to provide further insights, 
especially regarding RDT, in that examining the relationship between board networking and 
EO as moderators could provide deeper insights into a hypothesized mechanism (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986). 
4.6 Conclusion 
This study challenges prior literature that suggests the municipal owner of a public 
enterprise is the source of the inertia hindering entrepreneurial activities. However, we reveal 
minority shareholders exerting a negative effect on public enterprises’ EO when engaging in 
networking activities. Consequently, this study advances research at the intersection of 
entrepreneurship and governance and clearly helps to understand the effects of board behavior 




Appendix of Section 4 
Table A3: Overview of measurement scales (latent variables) 
Construct with respective items Scale Reference 
Independent variables   
Board networking: 
The board provides … 
- … linkages to important external stakeholders (banks, financial institutions, customers, 
public authorities …). 






- The company is subject to severe restrictions in the selection of markets and products. 
For example, the demand for certain services must be satisfied regardless of the costs 
incurred by the company. / The company is not restricted in the selection of markets and 








Lioukas et al. 
(1993) 
Dependent variables   
Board strategy control: 
Regarding the ratifying stage of decisions, the board is involved in the areas of: 
- Marketing and customers 
- Product development and technology 
- The competence among employees 
Regarding the monitoring stage of decisions, the board is involved in the areas of: 
- Marketing and customers 
- Product development and technology 








Entrepreneurial orientation (innovativeness): 
- In general, the top managers of my firm favor … 
A strong emphasis on the marketing of tried and true products or services / A strong 
emphasis on R&D, technological leadership, and innovations. 
- How many new lines of products or services has your firm marketed in the past 5 years? 
No new lines of products or services. / Very many new lines of products or services. 
- Changes in product or service lines have been mostly of a minor nature. / Changes in 







Entrepreneurial orientation (proactiveness): 
- In dealing with its competitors, my firm … 
Typically responds to actions which competitors initiate. / Typically initiates actions 
which competitors then respond to. 
- In dealing with its competitors, my firm … 
Is very seldom the first business to introduce new products/services, administrative 
techniques, operating technologies, etc. / Is very often the first business to introduce 
new products/services, administrative techniques, operating technologies, etc. 
- In general, the top managers of my firm have … 
A strong tendency to “follow the leader” in introducing new products or ideas. / A 









Entrepreneurial orientation (risk-taking): 
- In general, the top managers of my firm have … 
A strong proclivity for low-risk projects (with normal and certain rates of return). / A 
strong proclivity for high-risk projects (with chances of very high returns). 
- In general, the top managers of my firm believe that … 
Owing to the nature of the environment, it is best to explore it gradually via timid, 
incremental behavior. / Owing to the nature of the environment, bold, wide-ranging acts 
are necessary to achieve the firm’s objectives. 
- When confronted with decision-making situations involving uncertainty, my firm … 
Typically adopts a cautious, “wait-and-see” posture in order to minimize the probability 
of making costly decisions. / Typically adopts a bold, aggressive posture in order to 










Table A3: Overview of measurement scales (latent variables) (continued) 
Construct with respective items Scale Reference 
Control variables   
Hostility: 
- The failure rate of firms in my industry is high. 
- My industry is very risky, such that one bad decision could easily threaten the viability 
of my business unit. 
- Competitive intensity is high in my industry. 
- Customer loyalty is low in my industry. 
- Severe price wars are characteristic of my industry. 
- Low profit margins are characteristic of my industry. 
Five-point 
Likert 
Green et al. 
(2008) 
Board knowledge: 
The board has extensive knowledge on the … 
- … activities of the key business functions. 
- … firm’s critical technologies and key competences. 
- … firm’s products and services. 










- The overall performance of my enterprise in the last three years has been very good 







Table A4: Information on construct reliability and AVE 





Board networking 0.77 0.84 0.89 0.81 
Social orientation - - - - 
Dependent variables 
Board strategy control 0.83 0.86 0.87 0.53 
Entrepreneurial orientation 0.79 - 0.88 0.71 
Control variables 
Hostility 0.74 0.64 0.81 0.52 
Board knowledge 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.79 






5. Discussion and conclusion 
In the final three sections of this dissertation, I will summarize the results and highlight 
the contributions of the individual studies as well as the contributions of the dissertation to 
research and practice as a whole (Section 5.1). Based on the remarks in Section 5.1, I will outline 
some promising paths for future research (Section 5.2). In the last section, I will close this 
dissertation with some final and summarizing thoughts (Section 5.3). 
5.1 Summary and discussion of results 
The introduction to this dissertation outlined the importance of the public sector and its 
enterprises as impactful but unrecognized entrepreneurial actors (Bruton et al., 2015; 
Mazzucato, 2018). The dissertation subsequently shed light on entrepreneurship in public 
enterprises to fulfill the primary goal of deepening our understanding of entrepreneurship in the 
public sector and support the development of high-performing public enterprises. To do so, it 
addressed the overarching research question: 
What are the peculiarities of the public sector and how do they impact public enterprises’ EO? 
To achieve the primary goal and to answer the above research question, the articles in 
this thesis extended the understanding of entrepreneurship in this public-sector context in the 
following ways: The SLR (Section 2) provided a solid foundation for the two following studies 
by providing an overview and analysis of previous research on PE. The extensive data 
collection exercise revealed 40 articles addressing entrepreneurship in public enterprises, with 
a particular focus on EO. The small number of relevant articles compared to the broad search 
string in three databases (see Figure 2) underlines the limited amount of research on this specific 
phenomenon: Research specifically on public enterprises has been obfuscated by privatization 
processes being the dominant global trend since the 1980s and thus hogging the research 
limelight (Bernier, 2011). The number of publications per year now reflects an upward trend 
(see Figure 3) and underlines the increasing volume of attention paid to the field as the 
phenomenon of public enterprises has recently been reinvigorated (Bernier & Reeves, 2018). 
When analyzing the 40 articles, I revealed that EO studies in the public sector remain scarce, 




2012), which might have prompted the inadequate level of attention to public peculiarities such 
as institutional questions on government ownership. Ramamurti (1986) made important 
contributions to the field with pioneering thoughts on the topic. Kearney et al. (2007) built on 
these thoughts and developed the first conceptual model of PE. Subsequently, Kearney et al. 
(2010) and Kearney et al. (2013) followed this model and both studies found that EO did not 
apply to their mixed sample of public-sector organizations. Importantly, Smith (2012, 2014) 
deviated from this (inappropriate) approach of interpreting the public sector as an entity (Liddle 
& McElwee, 2019) and Smith (2012) did find support for the hypothesis that public enterprises 
have a significantly higher level of EO than other public organizations. Both articles (Smith, 
2012, 2014) contributed extensively to the foundation of this dissertation as they explicitly 
focus on public enterprises, underlining their importance as entrepreneurial actors albeit with 
essential unanswered questions. Smith (2014) in particular highlights the important but to date 
neglected role of the governing body in this specific public context. One overarching finding 
of the SLR is that the stimulators of and barriers to EO in the public sector as well as potential 
outcomes of EO remain unclear (Kearney et al., 2009; Smith, 2014). 
Consequently, the qualitative Study 2 (Section 3) focused on barriers to PE and potential 
outcomes of PE being inhibited within two different business segments. This study adopted an 
explorative CCM approach (Laukkanen, 2012). I examined sales and the distribution grid of 12 
German (majority-)municipally owned energy suppliers through 18 semi-structured interviews. 
The consideration of the two different business segments was motivated by recent calls to 
differentiate the public sector instead interpreting it as a monolith entity (Liddle & McElwee, 
2019) and additionally to define clear sample boundaries (Lomberg et al., 2017; Miller, 2011). 
Following from this line of argumentation, the results of the current study indicate that the 
segment-specific barriers contribute to prior calls for fine-grained research on PE depending on 
the context of the segment (Bysted & Hansen, 2015; Smith, 2014). This fine-grained 
perspective means that substantially different approaches to managing and stimulating the 
underlying dimensions of an EO might be required to enhance each segment’s performance. 
Furthermore, Study 2 built on the extensive theoretical framework associated with NPM and 




comparative analysis of the results with literature referring to the private and the public sector. 
The extensive comparative analysis revealed that the barriers associated with the external 
environment such as legal constraints (e.g., Bernier, 2014) and those barriers arising from 
within the organization such as employee behavior linked to a value system hampering 
entrepreneurial thinking corroborate aspects discussed in prior research (e.g., Morris & Trotter, 
1990; Mühlemeier, 2019). However, and of utmost importance, the results also show that a 
public enterprise’s supervisory board can hinder its progress, thus revealing a feature that could 
distinguish public from private enterprises. This finding built the foundation of the third study 
of this dissertation. 
Consequently, the quantitative Study 3 (Section 4) focused on this specific phenomenon 
when examining the impact of board behavior on public enterprises’ EO. My co-authors and I 
combined SAT and RDT that was recently suggested to offer a “powerful conceptual 
[foundation] that can be used to address issues of board governance in entrepreneurship 
research” (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2017, p. 53) but had been neglected in prior research. In 
particular, SAT challenges some assumptions of the traditionally applied agency theory, which 
is predominantly used in the private sector (Boivie et al., 2016). Agency theory assumes that 
the board challenges the top management to support innovation and increase the long-term 
valuation of the firm (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Gabrielsson, 2007); however, SAT states that 
diversification of products and/or markets might stimulate resistance by the BoD (Hill & Jones, 
1992). Therefore, SAT can be applied to support prior views on the topic indicating that 
entrepreneurial ideas might be filtered by the public enterprise’s supervisory board (Bernier, 
2014). We collected primary data from 110 German majority-governmental owned energy 
suppliers via a questionnaire. The results indicate that social orientation represses EO and while 
we did find some support for the reduced involvement of local public owners in BSC, we do 
not find a negative effect of BSC on EO. This finding contributes to two discussions in the 
research arena. First, the part of the finding reporting reduced involvement supports predictions 
referring to a lack of incentives and capacity problems afflicting the boards of public enterprises 
(e.g., in NIE). Second, the negative effect of BSC on EO predicted in SAT was not supported 




challenged the widespread prejudice that a BoD dominated by politicians generally has negative 
effects on the organization in question (e.g., Bernier, 2014; Sidki & Boll, 2019; Sørensen, 
2007). It is particularly important to recognize the role of minority shareholders like mixed 
enterprises and hub firms. The former is often described as performing better than a public 
enterprise (e.g., Brouthers et al., 2007; Inoue et al., 2013; Megginson & Netter, 2001; Wright 
et al., 2000), and the latter as nurturing innovativeness and performance among the 
organizations they are affiliated to (Kolloch & Reck, 2017). However, my co-authors and I 
revealed a negative effect of the board networking–EO relationship when such enterprises hold 
minority shares in the focal public enterprise (Figure 7). This finding contributes to a 
fine-grained conceptualization of RDT and therefore advances comparable research by 
overcoming the limitations of input-output modeling (e.g., Zona et al., 2018). Overall, this study 
constitutes a major step forward regarding board behavior and its impact on EO in public 
enterprises in respect of different ownership structures. It especially challenges prior 
suggestions that politicians serving on a BoD might represent a general barrier to 
entrepreneurial activities. On a general level, this study consequently advances research at the 
intersection of entrepreneurship and governance. 
With respect to the primary purpose of this dissertation of extending the understanding 
of entrepreneurship in the public sector and supporting the development of high-performing 
public enterprises in respect of the peculiarities of the public sector, I contribute to the academic 
literature in several ways. 
First and most importantly, this dissertation sheds light on the fundamental but woefully 
underrecognized questions regarding government ownership. The theoretical framework 
building on the assumptions of NIE and public choice suggests that public and private 
enterprises differ in their behavior and performance (e.g., Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000). Public 
enterprises are expected to be less entrepreneurial, less efficient, and to perform worse than 
their private counterparts (Hinz & Ingerfurth, 2013; Martin & Parker, 1997). An important 
finding of this dissertation is that different ownership structures do not directly predict changes 
in EO, which addresses the research gap recorded in Table 3 in the SLR. Differences in 




that supports notions that a lack of incentive and lack of monitoring capacity can afflict boards 
of directors operating in the public sector (Blankart, 1983; Cahan et al., 2005; Davies, 1971). 
Generally, it is more a matter of the social orientation and board networking behavior of 
minority shareholders (if present) that repress the EO of public enterprises. Importantly, the 
finding referring to minority shareholders therefore represents a potentially contrasting finding 
to the often taken-for-granted proposition of stronger performance being attributed to mixed 
enterprises and the positive impact of hub firms (e.g., Inoue et al., 2013; Kolloch & Reck, 2017). 
Second, the samples in both empirical studies in Sections 3 and 4 solely comprise 
German majority-government-owned energy suppliers. This dissertation therefore answers the 
recent but often unrecognized calls for research on a specific type of organization in a specific 
context (Lomberg et al., 2017; Miller, 2011). This approach of solely including a specific type 
of organization might confine generalizability, but may help to increase the validity of the 
research findings as this approach clearly defines the sample’s boundaries (Miller, 2011). Such 
an approach is especially useful in public-sector research for the following reasons: First, the 
field commonly defines the public sector as a monopolistic entity that is relatively independent 
of external influences, which is inadequate (Liddle & McElwee, 2019). Second, remarkable 
differences in the entrepreneurial activities of public-sector organizations have been revealed 
in prior work (Morris & Jones, 1999; Smith, 2012, 2014). The finding was corroborated by the 
qualitative study in this dissertation revealing remarkable differences between two different 
business segments in German public enterprises. In general, this finding contributes to prior 
calls for fine-grained research on PE attuned to the context of the segment concerned (Bysted 
& Hansen, 2015; Smith, 2014). The differences in barriers and outcomes revealed mean that 
substantially different approaches to managing and stimulating the underlying entrepreneurial 
dimensions might be required to enhance each segment’s performance. 
The third, and most generally applicable contribution, is that the studies in this 
dissertation strengthen the perspective that EO is applicable and relevant in the public sector. 
The conflict of EO applicability was highlighted and discussed in the SLR (Section 2) (Kearney 
et al., 2010; Smith, 2012). This dissertation stresses the point that the public sector is not 




Overall, this dissertation sheds light on the peculiarities of the public sector by investigating the 
role of supervisory boards mainly comprising politicians. It constitutes a major step forward in 
illuminating board behavior in public enterprises and its effects on EO. My co-authors and I 
advance board-related theory as we found no support for the predictions of SAT but support for 
a fine-grained perspective on RDT. 
In summary, this dissertation offered a systematic overview of the state of the art 
regarding entrepreneurship and EO in public enterprises (Section 2), shed light on unclear 
barriers to entrepreneurship and outcomes of entrepreneurship being inhibited (Section 3), and 
stressed the importance of the behavior of a public-sector BoD and its impact on a public 
enterprise’s EO, given different ownership structures (Section 4). Consequently, this 
dissertation broadens the research stream of corporate entrepreneurship (e.g., Kuratko, 2017; 
Morris et al., 2011) and contributes to recent efforts to encourage a spillover of EO into the 
public sector (Covin & Wales, 2019; Martens et al., 2016). The dissertation therefore deepens 
the understanding of entrepreneurship in the public sector and supports the development of 
high-performing public enterprises. 
In addition to the contributions to research mentioned above, several findings have 
important implications for practice. First, and with special reference to the third study (Section 
4), we found local public ownership to predict a lower level of involvement in BSC. This 
finding seems especially important and demands further clarification. Board members 
representing the public owner (and therefore the citizens as the ultimate owners) have great 
societal and democratic relevance because citizens rely on their monitoring activity as the 
ownership of those citizens is too dispersed to monitor the enterprise accurately (Desender et 
al., 2013). Given that weaker controls might be explained by a lack of incentives and by 
monitoring capacity problems afflicting the BoD representing the local public owner (Boivie et 
al., 2016; Cahan et al., 2005; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), e.g. because of excessive demands, it 
might be productive to increase collective action on the part of local citizens by increasing their 
participation in public enterprise’s activity. For example, this could be done by extensive 
information provision of the citizens by the top management or direct power of co-decision of 




property rights and reduce the cost of monitoring public officials and thus lead to strengthening 
the incentive for a local public BoD to properly monitor the actions of the enterprise. Another 
way to increase the involvement in control activities of local boards of directors might be to 
reduce the potential impact of capacity problems by encouraging knowledge enhancement 
among such boards and allocating them enough time to complete their tasks properly (Boivie 
et al., 2016). Second, the repressing effect of board networking activities undertaken by 
minority shareholders on a public enterprise’s EO might be an outcome of an entrepreneurial 
decision taken by the public enterprise. It might be valuable to outsource risky undertakings 
without clear and certain outcomes as this might be part of the public enterprise’s strategy to 
ensure adequate profits (OECD, 2015b). At this point it should be noted that excessive 
risk-taking without simultaneously emphasizing the other EO dimensions of innovativeness 
and/or proactiveness might be detrimental to performance (Kollmann & Stöckmann, 2014; 
Lomberg et al., 2017) and consequently run counter to the firm’s strategy. Furthermore, the 
repressing effect occasioned by minority shareholders undertaking board networking activities 
might help decision-makers in public enterprises to predict potential effects of changes in 
ownership structures on EO. 
5.2 Avenues for future research 
Albeit each of the three included studies has its limitations that illuminate paths for 
future research, additional avenues may emerge from the content of this dissertation as a whole. 
First, the treatment of the phenomenon of entrepreneurship in the public sector may 
generate new insights based on the importation of the concept of institutional logics, as already 
suggested by Miller (2011) in the context of the field of entrepreneurship in general. 
Institutional logics are defined as “the socially constructed, historical pattern of material 
practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce 
their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, p. 804; see also Jackall, 1988 and Friedland & Alford, 1991). 
Interestingly, Miller (2011, p. 882) also pointed out that “corporate governance and the nature 




potentially different logics of politicians serving on the board and those of the top management 
of public enterprises might impact enterprises’ EO (Mühlemeier, 2019). While almost neglected 
in PE research (with a few exceptions such as Gooneratne & Hoque, 2016 and Vining & 
Weimer, 2016), a promising but rare research example to build on is offered by Cho & 
Hambrick (2006) who focused on the attention of the top management team (TMT) being 
affected by the issues surrounding airline deregulation. The study found that deregulation 
induced the TMT to shift from a government logic to a market logic with a more entrepreneurial 
perspective. That shift was a consequence of the composition of the TMT: The advent of a 
higher proportion of managers with experience in marketing, sales, and research and 
development positively affected the entrepreneurial attentional perspective of the firm (Cho & 
Hambrick, 2006). 
While this paper reveals several new insights regarding the effect of deregulation, a 
promising avenue for future research would be to capture institutional logics in the boardroom, 
and therefore to go beyond the investigation of the TMT. Such research could directly build on 
the findings of the qualitative study in this dissertation (Section 3) and Smith (2014, p. 719) 
who state that “[the board of] directors are politicians, and the interviewees stressed that 
because of the diverse political composition, discussion that they have taken part of in board 
meetings can be more political than business-oriented” and Olsen et al. (2017, p. 393) who state 
that “municipal corporate boards have become meeting-places for different institutional logics.” 
Research designs capable of capturing institutional logics would be most valuable because, in 
contrast to EO, such institutional logics are not directly measurable via questionnaires 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). It is important to note that “there is very limited discussion about 
how [institutional logics] can be identified, described, and measured” (Reay & Jones, 2016, p. 
442). Qualitative studies of the activity in the boardroom might produce a more accurate picture 
if they were to utilize a combination of documents, interviews, and observations (Hoppmann et 
al., 2019). Such studies would extend prior work which has often tried to measure institutional 
logics via (automated) text analysis capturing the terms used in corporate documents on the 
grounds that “the cognitive categories through which individuals attend to the world are 




1956 and Thornton & Ocasio, 1999 for more information on the topic of measurement and the 
linguistic background). 
Second, another promising research avenue is offered by comparative studies. This 
conclusion is based on recent fundamental questions posed regarding CE in the public sector 
such as “…might it be that concepts and theories from the corporate entrepreneurship are so 
context specific and limited in perceived usefulness because public sector organizations are so 
different that they require an entirely different theoretical and methodological approach?” 
(Liddle & McElwee, 2019, p. 1317). Future studies could build on prior attempts, such as that 
of Kearney et al. (2013) using a sample of 192 private enterprises from the United 
States/Slovenia and 134 public organizations from Ireland. Unfortunately, these attempts were 
incomplete as they did not incorporate EO into their model and inadequately defined the 
sample’s boundaries when considering the public sector as an entity. Research in a similar 
comparative setting could make an important contribution to answering recent calls to broaden 
the concepts of CE and EO (e.g., Covin & Wales, 2019; Kuratko, 2017; Liddle & McElwee, 
2019). 
Although this dissertation has shown that EO positively correlates with past 
performance in respect of German majority-government-owned energy suppliers, there remains 
scope for far more investigation into those mechanisms that have already been examined in the 
private-sector context. For example, this dissertation tested the predictions of SAT regarding 
potentially contrary effects of BSC on EO compared to the effects reported in the private sector 
but found no support for such effects from its data. It would be valuable to compare models of 
public and private enterprises working in the same market environment, such as public and 
private enterprises in the German energy market. While such a line of research might end up 
comparing public and private firms dichotomously (as criticized by Bruton et al. (2015) with 
respect to prior studies), such a constellation would ensure a focus on specific types of 
organizations (public and private enterprises in the German energy market) (Bysted & Hansen, 
2015; Smith, 2014) which is often not recognized (e.g., Kearney et al., 2010; Kearney et al., 




It is not only the classic public/private sector comparisons that would seem valuable for 
future research; it might also be interesting to compare the impact of the governmental owner 
on EO in public enterprises in democratic and non-democratic countries according to the 
established categorization of democracy indexes (see, e.g., Munck & Verkuilen, 2002; 
Acemoglu et al., 2019; Roser, 2020). Non-democratic situations might involve higher levels of 
political freeriding leading to sub-optimal performance of the country’s enterprises (Cornett et 
al., 2010; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) as the effects of corruption in politics seem also to affect 
post-privatization market structures (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013; Bjorvatn & Søreide, 2005). 
Third, the current COVID-19 pandemic has led to a global economic and (even more 
importantly) social crisis. These crises are global and have suddenly impaired economies 
(Kuckertz et al., 2020). One effect has been to highlight how important are high-performing 
public enterprises and their services to meet a general public interest (Bernier, 2014; Gaspar et 
al., 2020). Current research addresses the importance of those services particularly in the form 
of public enterprise’s contribution to fostering low-income entrepreneurship in developing and 
advanced economies (Morris et al., 2020) as well as accelerating private-sector growth in 
general (Klein et al., 2010; Mazzucato, 2018). It remains the case that the measurement of 
performance of public enterprises with special reference to public value is still a major gap in 
academic literature (Faulkner & Kaufman, 2018; Klein et al., 2010; Voorn et al., 2020). 
Although this dissertation has addressed the potential outcomes of PE within two different 
business segments in public enterprises in a qualitative manner, general research has tested only 
a very small number of quantitative measures to date (Faulkner & Kaufman, 2018). Of those 
quantitative measures, “[none was] developed in a manner that could be consistently applied 
across all government contexts. Instead, all measures were specific to the contexts for which 
they were developed and covered only some dimensions of public value” (Faulkner & 
Kaufman, 2018, p. 80). Future research could therefore focus on the formulation of reliable 
measurement scales of public value that are devised according to the specific steps of such a 
development process (Clark & Watson, 1995; DeVellis, 2003). It would be valuable for future 
research to include the perspectives on public value of different stakeholders (e.g., public 




on the topic of public value and would also make it possible to test the relationship between EO 
and public value to enhance the knowledge on EO in the public sphere. 
In sum, all the above potential avenues for future research would contribute to the 
under-researched topic of entrepreneurship in the public sector (Liddle & McElwee, 2019; 
Martens et al., 2016) and embed the idea of entrepreneurship in territory beyond that of classic 
private-sector corporates to support the development of high-performing public enterprises. 
5.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this dissertation has shed light on corporate entrepreneurship in the public 
sector. It highlights the currently underrated relevance of government as an essential 
entrepreneurial actor and has illuminated the shadowy status of public enterprises in the 
public-sector entrepreneurialism research context. Therefore, this dissertation refers to the 
special setting of public enterprises working in liberalized market environments and the 
behavior of their BoD. However, I am aware that this dissertation only takes a first step toward 
generating a holistic picture of public enterprises and its EO. As part of a general overview on 
the topic, I have acknowledged the work’s limitations and the still under-researched but 
important topics that represent promising avenues for future research. Overall, I am confident 
that this dissertation helps to sharpen the picture of public enterprises in entrepreneurship 
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